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Introduction 
CONTRACT 
remedies have long sought to protect the gains 
that parties contract to realize. Although the Restatement rec 
ognizes three distinct contractual interests—expectation, reliance, 
and restitution—it expressly privileges the expectation interest over 
the other two. Courts "[o]rdinarily . . . enforce[] the broken prom 
ise by protecting the expectation that the injured party had when 
he made the contract."1 
In recent years, both courts and scholars have begun to question 
how the law should protect a promisee's expectation. This question 
once had a conventional—indeed, assumed—answer. Courts, the 
Restatement observes, ordinarily protect the promisee's expecta 
tion "by attempting to put him in as good a position as he would 
have been in had the contract been performed";2 that is, by 
"giv[ing] the injured party the 'benefit of the bargain.'"3 The Uni 
form Commercial Code similarly recites that contract remedies are 
designed to put the aggrieved party "in as good a position as if the 
other party had fully performed."4 Conventional contract law thus 
does not put the promisee in the position of receiving the promised 
performance but rather puts him "in as good a position" by requir 
ing the promisor to pay money damages that equal the benefit of 
the promisee's lost bargain. In the current lexicon, contractual ex 
pectations conventionally receive liability rather than property rule 
protection. 
That contract remedies should vindicate the expectation interest 
through liability rules has become controversial.5 The controversy 
is best introduced by clarifying basic terms. 
1 
The complete statement recites: 
Ordinarily, when a court concludes that there has been a breach of contract, it 
enforces the broken promise by protecting the expectation that the injured 
party had when he made the contract. It does this by attempting to put him in as 
good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed, that 
is, had there been no breach. The interest protected in this way is called the 
"expectation interest." 




4 U.C.C. §l-305(a) (2011). 5 
Among the more prominent critics, see, e.g., Melvin Eisenberg, The Disgorgement 
Interest in Contract Law, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 559, 562 (2006) [hereinafter Eisenberg, 
The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law]; Melvin Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual 
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A Liability Rule: The law protects an entitlement by a liability 
rule when it requires an infringer of the entitlement to pay the enti 
tlement holder a sum of money fixed by a third party, typically a 
court. Under contract law, the promisee is entitled to the benefit of 
his bargain, which the promisor infringes by breaching. The law ac 
cords liability rule protection to the entitlement because a court or 
jury fixes the entitlement's value and requires the promisor to pay 
it as damages. 
A Property Rule: The law protects an entitlement with a prop 
erty rule when it makes the entitlement holder's acquiescence a 
necessary condition for transfer of the entitlement. Contract law 
would protect the expectation with a property rule if it required the 
promisor always to render the promised performance rather than a 
monetary substitute for it. Under property rule protection, the 
promisee could obtain specific performance as of right. 
Both liability and property rule protection of a contractual ex 
pectation focus on the value that the promisee places on perform 
ance. Liability rule protection permits the promisor to "take" the 
entitlement and later pay, or comply with a court order requiring 
her to pay, the promisee's value. Property rule protection would 
permit the promisee to enjoin unconsented takings, thereby requir 
ing the promisor to repurchase the entitlement from the promisee.6 
A Restitutionarv Rule: In contrast to liability and property rules, 
a restitutionary rule such as disgorgement7 focuses on any value the 
promisor possesses that is attributable to the promisee. The Re 
Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle 
in Contract Law, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 975, 977-78 (2005) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Actual 
and Virtual Specific Performance]; Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 
18 J. Legal Stud. 1-2 (1989); Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 
107 Mich. L. Rev. 1551, 1565-66 (2009) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Could Breach of Con 
tract Be Immoral]; Seana Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 
Harv. L. Rev. 708, 710 (2007) [hereinafter Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and 
Promise]; Richard R. W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 Yale 
L.J. 568, 572-73 (2006). We postpone a detailed discussion of the literature to Part III 
below. 
6 
By "repurchase," we mean that the promisor must pay a sum satisfactory to the 
promisee for permission not to render the promised performance. 7 
The disgorgement remedy requires a breaching promisor to pay to the promisee 
the net monetary gain the promisor realized from breach. Disgorgement is used, for 
example, when a promisor/seller has sold contract goods to a good faith purchaser for 
value, so specific performance is rendered unavailable. 
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statement describes the promisee's restitutionary entitlement as his 
"interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has con 
ferred on the other party."8 This benefit can include gains that the 
promisor realized from breach if the parties' contract contributed 
to their existence. A restitutionary rule is enforced by an order re 
quiring the promisor to pay over the value in her hands. 
Some critics, including both commentators and courts, argue that 
contract law should protect the expectation with a property rule. 
Other (and overlapping) critics support vindicating the restitution 
interest.9 The critics are beginning to have an impact on the posi 
tive law.10 The classical expectation remedy, long a fixed point of 
contract law, is coming under threat. 
This Article rejects both categories of criticism in favor of de 
fending contract law's conventional preference for protecting the 
expectation interest with a liability rule. Although we defend the 
(increasingly insecure) status quo, we do so by novel arguments. 
Novelty matters in this case. The familiar arguments in favor of 
current law do not quite address the revisionist wave. Our argu 
ments refute the revisionists' claims head-on. 
Before introducing these arguments, we make a further clarify 
ing remark concerning renegotiation.11 Renegotiation is unneces 
sary when contract law protects the expectation with a liability 
rule. A promisor who rejects performance is required only to pay 
the promisee's foregone value. She therefore can make value 
maximizing perform-or-breach decisions unilaterally. In contrast, 
parties may renegotiate under property rule or restitution protec 
tion. Promisor exit from a contract may, we show below, create a 
greater total gain than performance. In this event, a promisee with 
property rule protection has an incentive to renegotiate to a new 
arrangement, under which the promisor is permitted to exit in re 
turn for sharing with the promisee the larger gain that exit makes 
possible. Restitution protection permits the promisee to capture 
8 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344(c) (1981). 9 
See authorities cited supra note 5 and discussion infra note 18 and accompanying 
text. 
10 
See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 11 
In contract theory, parties renegotiate when they jointly alter contractual entitle 
ments after they learn the true state of the world. For example, parties may agree to 
raise or lower the price when they learn the seller's actual cost of performance. 
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the gain that exit from a contract can create. The promisor, how 
ever, can prevent this gain from coming into existence by perform 
ing. Hence, the promisee, again, has an incentive to permit promi 
sor exit in return for a share of the gain. Though the restitution 
remedy and property rule protection of the expectation focus dif 
ferently on the location of the gains from breach, the availability of 
renegotiation causes the two rules to generate the same payoffs for 
contracting parties. Recognizing this permits us, for convenience, 
to evaluate the expectation interest debate primarily by contrasting 
liability and property rules.12 
Taken together, these clarifications permit us now to state the 
core of our position: both the efficient administration of commer 
cial exchange and the commercial morality of the exchange rela 
tion require that promisors' obligations be set according to pro 
misees' gains from trade and that these obligations be vindicated by 
a mechanism in which courts assess the gains' monetary value. That 
is, contract law should retain its traditional commitment to vindi 
cating the promisee's expectation interest and should protect this 
interest by a liability rule. But we should not get ahead of our 
selves. Rather, we begin at the beginning, by rehearsing conven 
tional defenses of contract law's decision to protect the expectation 
interest with a liability rule, in order to establish the background 
against which recent critics have attacked the law and against 
which we construct our novel defenses. 
Contract remedies took their liability rule form many years ago, 
but until recently, the law lacked a theoretical justification. In the 
1970s, law and economics scholars constructed an efficiency ration 
ale that ranges over the three stages of a contractual relationship. 
Beginning at the last litigation stage, a court cannot protect the ex 
pectation unless it is informed of the promisee's gain: the value a 
12 
When we care not just about the parties' payoffs but also about the conceptual 
categories under which the payoffs are produced, we say so expressly. Part III ana 
lyzes the theoretical relation between restitution- and expectation-based justifications 
for protecting promisee interests. Note that property and restitutionary rules would 
diverge in practice as well as in theory if the promisee could require the promisor to 
breach so as to bring a breach gain into existence. Under restitution protection, the 
promisee would then be entitled to all of that gain. Richard R.W. Brooks, supra note 
5, makes a breach-forcing proposal, which we criticize below. See infra Subsection 
III.B.2. 
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buyer would have realized13or the cost the seller would have in 
curred.14 Parties inform courts, which makes the penultimate stage 
relevant. Then, the parties learn values and costs and make the 
performance/breach decision. Now let a seller, for example, dis 
cover an opportunity to sell to a third party or to redeploy her re 
sources to some entirely distinct purpose, rather than perform un 
der the initial contract. As long as the law requires the seller to pay 
the promisee's gain if she breaches, she will perform nevertheless 
unless her gain from breach would exceed the promisee's gain from 
performance. Protecting the expectation with a liability rule thus is 
ex post (that is, at the performance/breach stage) efficient. A pro 
misor breaches only if breach would produce a greater gain overall 
than performance would have done; otherwise, she performs. Now 
turn to the initial, contracting stage. Parties would contract for li 
ability rule protection of the expectation because this would maxi 
mize the expected contracting gain for the parties to share. This 
multi-stage justification for liability rule protection has a name— 
the "theory of efficient breach"—and it has become sufficiently 
familiar to appear in textbooks intended for students.15 
The theory of efficient breach is vacuous, however. To see why, 
focus initially on the penultimate stage, when the promisor decides 
whether to perform. The Coase Theorem teaches that when trans 
action costs are low and agents are informed, as in contracting 
situations, agents bargain to the efficient allocation of property 
rights if the status quo allocation is suboptimal. To apply the Theo 
rem here, let the law protect the expectation with a property rule— 
specific performance—and assume that performance of the parties' 
original contract would be inefficient: the promisor's loss from per 
formance would exceed the promisee's gain. In this circumstance, 
as just said, parties renegotiate to permit breach: that is, they rene 
gotiate to the result that a liability rule would have yielded on its 
own. Now let a liability rule obtain and assume that performance 
would be efficient: the promisee's performance gain exceeds the 
promisor's performance loss. In this circumstance, the promisor 
performs, which is the result that a property rule would have di 
13 
The law awards the buyer his value less the price. 14 
The law awards the seller the price less her cost. 15 
See Jeff Ferriell, Understanding Contracts 715-17 (2d ed. 2009); Robert A. Hill 
man, Principles of Contract Law 140-41 (2d ed. 2009). 
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rected. And to summarize, in the Coase Theorem environment that 
efficient breach theory assumes, efficient breach (and efficient per 
formance) occurs under every rule type. 
Efficient breach theory also fails at the contracting stage because 
it cannot explain why parties would agree to liability rule protec 
tion were they free to do so. If parties ex post capture the surplus 
that breach makes available under any remedy, all remedies are 
consistent with surplus maximization. The theory thus cannot show 
why parties would contract for any remedy in the feasible set 
rather than any other remedy. Indeed, liability rule protection ap 
pears particularly problematic from a contracting point of view. 
The remedy allocates the full gain from breach to the promisor, so 
the promisee apparently has no reason to agree to it. The morality 
of promising, furthermore, seems to vindicate the promisee's con 
cern. Even when breach is efficient, a breaching promisor appears 
to disappoint his promisee and violate his contractual obligations. 
The expectation remedy, however, apparently permits the promi 
sor to retain the gains from her breach. Efficiency is not generally 
regarded as a sufficient ground for the law to permit, and indeed 
encourage, such an apparent wrong. There are no analogous doc 
trines of efficient conversion or efficient theft, for example. 
There are two ways to rescue liability rule protection of the ex 
pectation interest from this theoretical lacuna. First, transaction 
costs may be lower under a liability rule. Second, the remedy may 
better encourage the parties to invest in the deal their contract is 
meant to protect. Under either explanation, protecting the expec 
tation with a liability rule increases net surplus and so permits the 
promisor to purchase the promisee's consent to the remedy. We 
later pursue the transaction cost idea, but it is important to note 
here that both explanations relax the two key assumptions that 
generate efficient breach theory. The first assumption is that trans 
action costs are zero (that is, contracting and renegotiation are 
costless). The second assumption is that parties do not invest in the 
contract.16 When these assumptions hold, however, the remedy is 
theoretically ungrounded. 
16 
To clarify, investment can be "general" or "relation specific." A seller makes a 
general investment when she builds a factory to make widgets and sells them to a 
wide variety of buyers. A seller makes a relation-specific investment when she pro 
duces a customized widget that only a particular buyer can use. Efficient breach the 
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In recent years, prominent critics, implicitly accepting the two 
assumptions that generate efficient breach theory, have stepped 
into the void to argue that the expectation interest remedy is the 
wrong rule. The critics make two related claims. First, they claim 
that liability rule protection of the expectation interest is unjust be 
cause it allocates the full gain from breach to the promisor. This 
claim assumes the promisee has a right to share in the gain that 
breach makes possible. The critics' second claim defends this as 
sumption. According to the critics, a contract law that permits an 
agent to bind herself to perform but also permits the agent to 
breach if she pays a legally set price—the expectation—is incoher 
ent. A law of contract must permit agents to bind themselves. 
Hence, the law is made coherent only if it protects the promisee's 
right to performance with a property rule. The default contract 
remedy thus should be specific performance. The analysis above 
illustrates how the critics' two claims are related. A promisee with 
a right to specific performance can capture a portion of the gain 
that breach makes possible by forcing the promisor to purchase the 
right to exit from the contract.17 
A legal rule whose theoretical foundation is shaky sometimes is 
replaced, so it is unsurprising that the expectation interest's critics 
have made real world progress. The Uniform Commercial Code 
liberalized the right to specific performance. Specific performance, 
however, sometimes is impractical: it takes too long to get. Specific 
performance also is impossible when the promisor has sold the 
property to a good faith purchaser. The disgorgement remedy ame 
liorates these difficulties because it requires the promisor to trans 
fer her gain from breach to the promisee. The recently adopted 
Restatement of Restitution permits a court to replace the expecta 
tion remedy with disgorgement when the remedy is inadequate,18 
ory is consistent with encouraging relation specific investment, but its putative contri 
bution is to explain why liability rule protection yields ex post efficiency. 17 
The restitution rule rests on the premise that the contract creates a right in the 
promisee to the potential gain from breach. This right grounds the promisee's distri 
butional claim because it is unjust, on the restitution theory, to deprive him of the ac 
tual gain. 18 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §39(1) (2011). A 
thoughtful analysis by the drafter appears in Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, 
the "Restitution Interest," and the Restatement of Contracts, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 2021, 
2028-29 (2001). 
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and "gain based damages" are beginning to be awarded in England 
and Israel.19 American courts also increasingly exhibit distaste for 
restricting contract damages to the promisee's loss when the pro 
misor benefitted from breach.20 Critics also argue that the pro 
misee's right to performance sometimes should be protected with 
the strongest remedy: punitive damages.21 
This Article thus enters an academic debate—Can liability rule 
protection of the expectation interest be justified?—that has real 
world consequences. Much in contract law will change if the critics' 
19 
For England, see Ralph Cunnington, The Assessment of Gain-Based Damages for 
Breach of Contract, 71 Mod. L. Rev. 559-60 (2008). For Israel, see Adras Building 
Material Ltd. v. Harlow & Jones Gmbh, 3 Restitution L. Rev. 235, 240, 242, 246, 249, 
261, 268 (1995). Adras is criticized in Andrew Botterell, Contractual Performance, 
Corrective Justice, and Disgorgement for Breach of Contract, 19 Legal Theory 135, 
154-55 (2010). 211 
Traditionally, disgorgement remedies were awarded only in narrow classes of 
cases. For example, disgorgement might be awarded in cases in which the breaching 
party violated a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty owed to the victim of the breach. 
See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) (awarding the CIA dis 
gorgement of profits earned by a former agent in connection with a tell-all book pub 
lished without being vetted as required by his contract of employment with the CIA); 
X-It Prods., L.L.C, v. Walter Kidde Portable Equip., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 577, 658 
(E.D. Va. 2001) (observing that "equitable remedies," including disgorgement, may 
be awarded in cases of "wrongfully obtained profits in a variety of contexts, including 
breach of fiduciary obligation or breach of contract" but suggesting that the proper 
award of these remedies depends on a factual finding of "unclean hands"); Ajaxo Inc. 
v. E*Trade Grp., Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 221, 248 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (awarding a dis 
gorgement remedy in connection with breach of a nondisclosure agreement governing 
trade secrets or proprietary confidential information). Another narrow class of cases 
in which disgorgement remedies have historically been awarded concerns breaches of 
contract to sell land, where courts, when they are unable to adopt the traditional spe 
cific performance remedy for technical reasons, have imposed constructive trusts on 
breaching sellers and required them to disgorge their gains from breach. See, e.g., 
Gassner v. Lockett, 101 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. 1958) (imposing a constructive trust against 
a breaching seller where a new buyer's recording of title prevented the court from or 
dering specific performance of the sale to the buyer against whom the seller 
breached). 
Recently, there has been a trend towards looking more favorably on disgorgement 
remedies in connection with ordinary breaches of contract. See Earthlnfo, Inc. v. Hy 
drosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113,119-20 (Colo. 1995) (approving resti 
tution for breach of contract where a defendant's wrongdoing leads directly to her 
profits); see also Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 342 F.3d 1298, 
1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (recognizing Earthlnfo as stating Colorado law); Dastgheib v. 
Genentech, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (approving of disgorgement 
in Earthlnfo-type situations); Daily v. Gusto Records, Inc., No. 3:94-1090, 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22537, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2000) (endorsing the Earthlnfo logic). 21 
See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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position captures the day. The changes, we argue here, would be 
for the worse, both economically and morally. 
Our argument rests on an old idea, to which we give a new 
name: the "dual performance hypothesis." The dual performance 
hypothesis justifies protecting the expectation with a damage rem 
edy. The hypothesis holds that contracts typically impose alterna 
tive obligations on the promisor: either to supply goods or services 
for a specified price or to transfer to the promisee the gain the 
promisee would have made had those goods or services been sup 
plied. Under the hypothesis, a promisor who fails to deliver the 
promised goods or services but instead transfers the gain to her 
promisee performs rather than breaches.22 The promisor breaches 
only if she neither delivers nor pays. A breach in this sense contra 
dicts the promisee's actual expectation—to receive goods or 
money—and thus reduces agents' incentives to organize their eco 
nomic affairs under contracts. On this view, "efficient breach" the 
22 
We attempt to advance Richard Craswell's insight regarding expectation damages 
that "the equivalent of the promised performance itself depends on the full and exact 
scope of what was promised—including the exact scope of what was promised in the 
event of a breachRichard Craswell, Expectation Damages and Contract Theory Re 
visited 12 (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 325, 2006); see also id. at 20-21; Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, 
and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489, 513 (1989) [hereinafter 
Craswell, Philosophy of Promising], We would substitute a phrase such as "the failure 
to tender the goods" for "breach." Our claim then is that the promisee receives "the 
equivalent of the promised performance" when the promisor makes a monetary trans 
fer that equals the promisee's gain from trade. This transfer is "the exact scope of 
what was promised in the event" that the promisor does not tender. We note, more 
over, that this conceptual recharacterization of the expectation remedy, which is de 
veloped in greater detail in Part III below, also answers Craswell's famous challenge 
that philosophical arguments have been unable to explain "those parts of contract law 
that govern the proper remedies for breach." See Craswell, Philosophy of Promising, 
supra at 517-21. 
Our view is beginning to be recognized in the economics literature. Bentley 
MacLeod defines a "warranty contract" as what we later call the "liability rule con 
tract": the buyer agrees to pay the price for a good that conforms to the contract and 
the seller agrees to make a transfer if the good does not conform. MacLeod remarks: 
"Observe that, under a warranty contract, the production of a defective good does not 
result in a breach of contract. Only if the seller refuses to compensate the buyer is 
there a breach." W. Bentley MacLeod, Reputations, Relationships, and Contract En 
forcement, 45 J. Econ. Literature 595, 602 (2007); see also Philippe Aghion & Benja 
min Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. 
Econ. & Org. 381,401 (1990). 
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ory not only is vacuous; "efficient breach" itself is a myth, because 
no true breach is efficient. 
Contract theorists of both an economic and a philosophical bent 
commonly either ignore the dual performance hypothesis or reject 
it as being psychologically and perhaps also ethically implausible.23 
"Thomas Scanlon's views are typical of those who fail even to consider the dual 
performance hypothesis: 
Suppose ... that I have promised to sell you my house ... that I could get more 
money by breaking my promise and selling that house to someone else is not a 
sufficient reason to do that.... At a more fundamental level,... what made my 
action wrong was not the fact that I acted for a bad (selfish) reason, but rather 
the fact that I had promised to sell you the house.... What makes it 
wrong... to sell to the second potential buyer is that I promised to sell to the 
first one. 
Thomas Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame 23-24 (2008). 
Scholars who do acknowledge the hypothesis have been rejecting it for a long time. 
Frederick Pollock wrote, in 1881, that 
[a] man who bespeaks a coat of his tailor will scarcely be persuaded that he is 
only betting with the tailor that such a coat will not be made and delivered to 
him within a certain time. What he wants and means to have is the coat, not an 
insurance against not having the coat. 
Frederick Pollock, Principles of Contract, at xix (London, Stevens & Sons rev. 3d ed. 
1881). For a modern view, see, among others, Stephen Smith, who claims: "It just 
seems implausible, as a matter of fact, to regard contracting parties as having agreed, 
in the typical case, to disjunctive obligations to perform or compensate." Stephen A. 
Smith, Contract Theory 402 (2004). Also: "[I]t is clear that there is a legal duty to per 
form a contract and . . . this duty is not fulfilled by paying damages." Stephen A. 
Smith, The Normativity of Private Law, 31 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 215, 238 (2011). 
Similarly, Andrew Gold claims that "as a general description of what parties intend, 
or even as an interpretation of the public meaning of contract language, [the dual per 
formance hypothesis] seems inadequate." Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of 
Contract, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 54 (2009). Eyal Zamir and Barak Medina take the 
same view, claiming that "[t]he very use of the terms 'breach' and 'remedies' attests to 
the prevailing conception that a contract is not ordinarily an option to perform or pay 
damages, but rather carries a moral obligation to perform." Eyal Zamir & Barak Me 
dina, Law, Economics, and Morality: A Response to Critics 31 (2011) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Assocation), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1867186); see also Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Econom 
ics, and Morality (2010). 
Commentators sympathetic to the hypothesis either assert it without development 
or raise the hypothesis only as a formal possibility. Jody Kraus thus observes: "[T]he 
efficient breach hypothesis presumes that many parties use the remedial default rules 
of contract to specify a morally acceptable alternative to performance of their prom 
ised act instead of writing an explicit alternative promise contract." Jody S. Kraus, 
The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1603,1638 (2009) 
(emphasis added). As evidence of Kraus's observation, Alan Schwartz and Robert 
Scott assert: "[W]hat contract performance requires is the goods in exchange for the 
contract price or the payment of an appropriate monetary substitute. Thus, the dam 
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A promisee, it is said, intends to contract for goods or services; he 
does not intend to sell an option that permits the promisor either 
to trade or to pay. Our argument against this view proceeds along 
two intertwined paths. One path, which is developed in Parts I and 
II, creates a simple model that rests on the two assumptions re 
marked above: transaction costs are zero, and parties do not invest. 
On these assumptions, the model permits us to make three points. 
First, a promisee's expected monetary payoff is at least as high 
under liability rule protection of the expectation as it would be un 
der property rule protection. This result refutes criticisms of cur 
rent law whose premise is that liability rule protection deprives 
promisees of the gains that they contracted to realize. To summa 
rize the logic of this result, let the promisor be a seller and define 
two types of contracting gains. The trading gain is the difference 
between the value the promisee would realize from trade and the 
promisor's cost of trade.24 The nontrading gain is the difference be 
tween the cost of trade and the promisee's value.25 When a seller 
rejects trade, a buyer with a right to specific performance realizes 
his trading gain and a portion of the nontrading gain. The seller 
must pay the buyer his trading gain because it is the buyer's expec 
tation, and the seller also must pay the buyer a share of the non 
trading gain in the form of a bribe for permitting the seller to exit. 
age remedy is itself a part of the contracted-for performance." Alan Schwartz & 
Robert E. Scott, Sales Law and the Contracting Process 389 (2d ed. 1991). Randy 
Barnett raised the dual performance hypothesis as a possibility in his effort to render 
the positive law governing personal services contracts consistent with his proposal for 
"a remedies rule which generally favors specific performance." See Randy Barnett, 
Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, in Philosophy and Law 179, 198 (Jules 
Coleman & Ellen Frankel Paul eds., 1987). We attempt to advance the argument by 
showing that parties would write dual performance contracts in the conditions most 
analysts suppose. 24 
To clarify, parties "contract" when they create the deal; parties "trade" when they 
exchange the specified goods or services for the price. In this paper, parties "transfer" 
when the promisor pays to the promisee in dollars the contractually specified portion 
of the trading gain. 25 
To illustrate, suppose that the promisee would realize 10 from performance and 
the promisor's cost would be 6. Then the parties will trade, producing a total gain of 4. 
We often assume below that parties function in competitive markets. In such markets, 
price equals cost, so the promisee/buyer would realize the full trading gain of 4. Sup 
pose next that the promisee's value remains 10, but the promisor's cost of perform 
ance rises to 15. The failure to trade thus would produce a "gain" of 5: the difference 
between the avoided promisor cost and the promisee's unrealized value. We denote 
the saved 5 as the nontrading gain. 
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A seller who rejects trade thus incurs a cost that is the sum of the 
trading gain and the bribe. Since prices include costs, the contract 
price when the buyer's expectation is protected with a property 
rule reflects both cost categories. Now, substitute the expectation 
remedy for the buyer's right to specific performance. Competition 
will then cause the price to fall by the magnitude of the bribe the 
seller no longer has to pay. Holding the buyer's value fixed, his 
damages increase as the price falls.26 And since the reduction in 
price equals the expected bribe, the damages remedy permits the 
buyer to share in the nontrading gain. The buyer thus does as well 
when his expectation is protected with a liability rule as when it is 
protected with a property rule. 
This result also shows that the movement to protect the expecta 
tion with property rules is as theoretically ungrounded as the effi 
cient breach defense of the expectation. If the promisee's gain un 
der a contract is invariant to the remedy the law supplies to enforce 
that contract, every remedy is as good as every other remedy.27 We 
therefore ask here whether promisees have second order reasons 
for preferring to share in the nontrading gain through the price 
mechanism—that is, through expectation damages—or to share in 
that gain through the renegotiation mechanism—that is, through a 
specific-performance-induced bribe. 
The second point the model supports is that contracting and bar 
gaining costs do create such second order reasons. This point is 
best introduced by assuming that parties are free to write either a 
"property rule contract" or a "liability rule contract."28 Our first 
point implies that the promisee's gross payoff would be the same 
under either contract type. We show below—our second point— 
that the cost of creating a property rule contract would exceed the 
26 
Recall that these damages are the buyer's foregone value less the price. 27 
Robert Scott and George Triantis make a similar criticism as part of their broader 
argument that contract damages should reflect the option value of performing or 
breaching. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the 
Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1428,1429 (2004). 
We do not take a position here as to their general claim. 28 
In this Article, a property rule contract exists either when the parties fail to con 
tract out of property rule protection when the law provides it or when the parties ex 
pressly authorize the promisee to obtain specific performance. A liability rule con 
tract either fails to contract out of liability rule protection when the law provides it or 
when the contract contains a liquidated damage clause. 
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cost of creating a liability rule contract. Buyers/promisees thus 
would have an incentive to write liability rule contracts because 
these generate higher net payoffs. Further, when a promisor/seller 
rejects trade, the property rule contract forces the parties into a bi 
lateral monopoly. Bargaining in this game is zero sum: every dollar 
the seller pays to the buyer is a dollar that the seller must lose. The 
seller's incentive to resist payment is increasing in the size of the 
payment the buyer seeks. Since, we show, the buyer has a higher ex 
post payoff under a property rule than under a liability rule, the 
seller bargains harder, and perhaps less ethically, to avoid paying 
him under the property rule. Reasoning such as this implies that 
current law is a better default than a property rule default.29 And 
the implication vindicates the dual performance hypothesis. 
Another implication of the dual performance hypothesis—our 
third point—is that the distinction between liability and property 
rule protection of the expectation is artificial. To see why, consider 
a widespread view that parties have no preferences regarding the 
remedies that the law provides unless their contract contains an 
express remedy term, such as a liquidated damages clause. This 
claim is implausible because parties take prices into account and 
the price is partly a function of the applicable remedy. When the 
remedy is viewed as an implied term, contract law necessarily pro 
29 
We defend the expectation remedy as a default, not as a mandatory rule. In most 
jurisdictions, however, current law is mandatory: courts do not enforce contracts for 
specific performance. See Edward Yorio, Contract Enforcement: Specific Perform 
ance and Injunctions 439-48 (1989), supplemented in Steve Thel, 2009 Cumulative 
Supplement 233-41. The proposed new U.C.C. Article 2, in § 2-716(1), recommends 
that courts should enforce specific performance terms in commercial contracts, but no 
state has adopted this Article, and it is about to be withdrawn. A recently published 
paper makes two claims regarding the disgorgement remedy: (a) it is awarded fre 
quently and (b) it is an efficient remedy when courts cannot fully protect the pro 
misee's expectation. See Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, You Do Have to Keep Your 
Promises: A Disgorgement Theory of Contract Remedies, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
1181 (2011). The first claim appears to reflect a recharacterization of the expectation 
remedy. Thus, market damages—the difference between the contract price and the ex 
post market price—are thought to protect the expectation. A promisor who sells to a 
third party at the ex post market price must pay market damages to the promisee. 
Since these damages equal her gain, Steve Thel and Peter Siegelman classify market 
damages as a disgorgement remedy. We use the more common classification of these 
damages here. We do not take up their second claim because our goal is to justify the 
expectation remedy when it does what it is meant to do. We argue below that parties 
should be permitted to contract for specific performance or disgorgement but that 
these should not be the default remedies. 
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tects the expectation with a property rule. Under a property rule 
contract, the seller promises to deliver goods or services unless de 
livery is impractical. Courts specifically enforce this contract by or 
dering delivery. Under a liability rule contract, the seller promises 
to deliver goods or services or make a monetary transfer in the 
amount of the promisee's foregone gain. Courts specifically en 
force this contract by ordering transfer.30 Thus, every contracting 
remedy is a form of specific performance. 
The other path along which our argument travels, which is de 
veloped in Part III, seeks to connect the structure of surplus shar 
ing that our model identifies to the normative structure of contrac 
tual obligation and the principles of promissory morality that 
contract law implicates. Our argument here involves two claims. 
First, the dual performance hypothesis is consistent with the 
normative structure of contractual obligation. Regarding theory, 
the dual performance hypothesis restores coherence to contract 
law. Contract law must permit parties to make binding promises. A 
law that restricts the promisee to the payment of a preset monetary 
sum is coherent if the promisor binds herself either to deliver goods 
or services or to pay that preset sum. Moreover, a promisee with 
out a right to the promisor's performance has the same expected 
payoff, or a higher payoff, than the promisee with that right. Thus, 
current contract law is as distributionally just as the law that the 
critics favor. We therefore reject the familiar suggestions that the 
expectation remedy merely prices, rather than sanctions, breach31 
'"Contract law views a seller's action for the price as a request to have the price 
term specifically enforced. Comment 7 to U.C.C. § 2-709 recites: "If the action for the 
price fails, the seller may nonetheless have proved a case entitling him to damages for 
non-acceptance." U.C.C. § 2-709 cmt. 7 (2011). Similarly, a buyer's suit for expecta 
tion damages, on our account, is a suit specifically to enforce the contract's transfer 
term. The difference between these cases is that the seller is suing to recover a num 
ber that the contract specifies—the price—while the buyer is suing to apply a formula 
that the contract specifies—value less price. This distinction is without normative sig 
nificance. 
31 
To make our point clear, the law would "price" breach if it specified what the 
promisor must pay in order to exit, independently of what the parties would want the 
promisor to pay. We argue here that the parties would want the promisor to pay the 
promisee's expectation. As such, the legal remedy is an implied term, not a price. Fur 
ther, we do not reject on moral grounds the position that the law should create a sanc 
tion, above the damages the expectation interest remedy implies, for a true breach: 
the promisor's failure either to trade or to transfer. 
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and that contract law betrays its own normative commitments 
when it encourages promisor exit. 
Second, the type of sharing associated with the dual performance 
hypothesis is morally appropriate for promisors and promisees who 
interact, as they do in contract, at arm's length. In making this ar 
gument, we take on the core moral objection to the dual perform 
ance hypothesis, which is (roughly) that the expectation remedy 
encourages promisors to behave, within the promise relation, in a 
self-interested way that betrays the solidarity that this relation 
should properly involve. We argue, to the contrary, that the thinner 
form of promissory solidarity associated with the dual performance 
hypothesis, in which the terms of contractual sharing are cabined 
by the parties' contract, is appropriate for commercial transactions 
in open, cosmopolitan economies. 
These claims, like the claims elaborated along our argument's 
first path, are principally formal or analytic. We develop a repre 
sentation result: a set of concepts that together characterize the 
practices, doctrines, and norms of commercial contracting. This re 
sult exhibits the surplus-sharing associated with contract doctrine's 
preference for protecting the expectation with a liability rule and 
elaborates the meaning of that sharing so as to render it consistent 
with the solidarity that contractual and promissory norms more 
generally require. These results thus answer the current criticisms 
of the expectation remedy because the criticisms themselves are 
largely formal and analytic. 
We conclude this Introduction with two remarks and a methodo 
logical observation. First, we analyze commercial transactions. Our 
paradigm case is an agreement to produce a widget, not an agree 
ment to cook dinner together on Thursday nights. This focus per 
mits us to abstract from the familial and affective claims to which 
contracts in private circumstances may give rise. It would be a 
category mistake, for example, to offer $50 to a friend when cir 
cumstances caused you to cancel a dinner date with him. It is not a 
category mistake for the promisors in our analysis to offer money 
to promisees when the promisors fail to deliver goods.32 
32 
Recent experimental papers elicit the opinions of individual subjects regarding the 
theory of efficient breach. A common response is that subjects, cast as promisors, 
would pay more than the promisee's expectation interest when they refuse to perform 
or that promisees would demand more than their expectation when the promisor fails 
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Analyzing commercial transactions also permits us plausibly to 
assume that parties are competent to make contracts and to rene 
gotiate them when circumstances change. We make this assump 
tion not only for its realism but also for heuristic reasons. Current 
critiques of contract law implicitly assume full rationality. They do 
not claim that the law constitutes a trap for the weak-minded but 
rather that a rational promisor can use the law to deprive her ra 
tional promisee of the full nontrading gain. We analyze this core 
contracting case to show that the concern is misplaced. 
Our second introductory remark is that we proceed by making 
explicit the assumptions that govern the current expectation inter 
est debate and then pursuing their implications. Those assumptions 
to comply with a contract's substantive terms. This is taken to exhibit the subjects' 
view that breaching on payment only of expectation damages is immoral. See, e.g., 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological 
Experiment, 108 Mich L. Rev. 633, 637 (2010); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. 
Hoffman, Breach Is For Suckers, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1003,1004-05,1013 (2010). These 
experiments are not relevant to our project for two reasons. First, the subjects are in 
dividual persons, not firms. A firm is more likely to exhibit behavior consistent with 
the maximization of monetary returns than an individual responding to a question 
naire. Second, and of greater significance, the subjects were told that nonperformance 
was a breach of contract, which assumes what should be argued for. In Wilkinson 
Ryan's second paper, subjects were asked to evaluate a scenario in which a contractor 
performed unsatisfactorily but did not offer compensation. Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoff 
man, supra, at 1014-15. The issue we pursue is whether the promisor would "break 
the contract" if she failed to deliver but made the transfer that the contract requires. 
Experimental subjects were not asked this question. See David Baumer & Patricia 
Marschall, Willful Breach of Contract for the Sale of Goods: Can the Bane of Busi 
ness Be an Economic Bonanza?, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 159, 164 (1992) (conducting a 
study in which subjects given a questionnaire were told that a "breach" was "deliber 
ate" and "willful"); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and 
Moral Heuristics In Breach of Contract, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 405, 405 (2009) 
(finding that persons assess the morality of breach partly on the basis of the promi 
sor's intentions). The most recent effort along these lines is Daphna Lewinsohn 
Zamir, The Questionable Efficiency of the Efficient Breach Doctrine, J. Institutional 
& Theoretical Econ. (forthcoming 2012). This paper reports an experiment in which 
Israeli students were asked whether they preferred a performance—the seller "will 
deliver"—to what we call a liability rule contract. A majority of the subjects under 
standably preferred performance, but this preference is not germane to the issues ana 
lyzed here. See Alan Schwartz, Comment on Zamir, J. Institutional and Theoretical 
Econ. (forthcoming 2012). A recent experimental study suggests that "people have a 
preference for keeping promises per se." Christoph Vanberg, Why Do People Keep 
Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations, 76 Econometrica 1467, 
1468 (2008). A promise, that is, "creates a contractual obligation toward the person to 
whom it is made." Id. at 1476. The question we ask, again, is just what, in commercial 
contracts, that "obligation" consists in. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.238 on Wed, 12 Mar 2014 20:38:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1956 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 97:1939 
hold: (a) parties know the values of the relevant economic parame 
ters; (b) parties know what their contracts do;33 (c) courts can pro 
tect the expectation with either a liability or a property rule be 
cause courts: (i) interpret contracts to realize the parties' 
preferences and (ii) learn the costs and values that trade would 
have implicated; (d) the parties' contracting and bargaining costs 
are zero; and (e) parties do not invest in the subject matter of the 
contract. We make these five assumptions for heuristic purposes: 
that is, we ask how contract remedies would actually function in 
the idealized world that current critics inhabit. This analysis per 
mits us to ask whether any remedy becomes preferable to any of 
the others when that world is made more realistic.34 
Finally, our formal model and our more discursive analyses are 
each constructed with the other in mind (this is why we say that the 
two paths of our argument are intertwined). The model's account 
of the structure of contractual sharing is developed to answer con 
ceptual concerns about the relationship between contract remedies 
and contractual solidarity. And our interpretive engagement with 
the doctrinal, normative, and moral structure of contract aims to 
elaborate this structure in light of the instrumental interactions be 
tween contracting parties that our model highlights. We return to 
comment on this marriage between economics and philosophy in 
our conclusion. 
Part I sets out a model of the parties' contracting problem, which 
Part II then solves. The model performs two functions. First, it 
shows formally that, on the Coase Theorem assumptions noted 
above, the promisee's expected return under a contract is invariant 
to the remedy the law supplies. Second, modeling commercial 
party preferences permits us to identify the circumstances in which 
parties prefer the liability rule contract, which permits the promi 
sor either to trade or to transfer, or the circumstances in which par 
ties prefer a property rule contract, which commits the promisor to 
trade. It is important to identify these circumstances because the 
33 
This assumption holds that parties read their contracts and are aware of the rele 
vant defaults. 
34 
The text later relaxes assumption (c)(ii)—property rule protection of the expecta 
tion then becomes desirable—and assumption (d)—liability rule protection then be 
comes desirable. Note 44 relaxes assumption (e). In an investment world, efficiency 
sometimes requires penalties to be imposed on breachers. 
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search is for the appropriate default remedy. Part III then inter 
prets the model's results to show how they clarify the normative is 
sues that occupy the literature and that are beginning to affect the 
law. 
I. A Model of Contracting 
A. An Example 
We introduce the model with a simple example that shows intui 
tively how the promisee does as well under liability rule protection 
of the expectation interest as under property rule protection, given 
the assumptions that govern the expectation interest debate. The 
example, and later model, assume that: (a) a contract that offers 
the buyer a right to specific performance is enforceable; (b) parties 
share any renegotiation surplus equally (the seller, that is, has 
equal bargaining power with any buyer);35 and (c) the market has 
several sellers. In the example, the product costs the seller 6 to pro 
duce. The associated "property rule price" for the product is 8. The 
seller makes a contract at the price of 8 with an initial buyer, who 
values the product at 10. This buyer's expectation is value less 
price: 10 - 8 = 2. In the interim between making the contract and 
the performance date, a second buyer approaches the seller to bid 
12; this buyer's valuation for the product is 14.36 
Social welfare from performing either contract is the buyer's 
value less the seller's cost (we assume no externalities). Hence, the 
social gain from performing the initial contract is Wj = Vj - c = 10 - 
6 = 4. Similarly, W2 = v2 
- c = 14 - 6 = 8. The marginal social gain 
from selling the product to the second buyer rather than the first is 
W2 - Wj = 8 - 4 = 4. Society thus prefers the second buyer to get the 
35 
The equal bargaining power assumption is without loss of generality. Our later 
results hold for any division of bargaining power. 36 
Respecting the realism of this common two buyer example, sales are classified in 
two polar categories: (a) common values: every potential buyer attaches the same 
valuation to the object being sold; and (b) independent private values: every potential 
buyer attaches a different valuation to the object, and each buyer knows only his own 
valuation. Many objects have both a common and an independent aspect. For exam 
ple, potential buyers usually attach different valuations to an art object, but the object 
would have a common value element if buyers have an investment motive. Then the 
buyers would be predicting the (same) future market price. The example in text as 
sumes that the object has a substantial independent value element, so that it is plausi 
ble for potential buyers to value the object differently. 
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product. The issue is how the first buyer and the seller allocate be 
tween them the additional 2 that the second bid of 12 creates. 
We assume initially that the parties' contract grants the initial 
buyer a right to specific performance for the property rule price of 
8. The buyer thus can prevent the seller from trading with the sec 
ond buyer; the seller must renegotiate to exit. Since the parties now 
have an additional 2 to share, the seller will pay the initial buyer a 
total of 3, his contractual expectation of 2 plus the 1 that is the 
buyer's equal share of the seller's share of the marginal social gain 
from selling to buyer two. The seller also earns 3, the new price of 
12 less her production cost of 6 and less the payment to the buyer 
of 3. 
Now assume that the buyer lacks a right to specific performance. 
It may seem that sharing will not occur. The seller will pay the 
buyer his expectation of 2 and trade with the second buyer, realiz 
ing a net gain of price less cost less damages, or 12 - 6 - 2 = 4. The 
seller, that is, apparently captures all of the new gain that the sec 
ond bid creates. 
To the contrary, sharing also occurs when the buyer lacks prop 
erty rule protection. The buyer's expected gain in the example is 2 
because the buyer is assumed to accept a liability rule contract at 
the property rule price. Assumption (c) holds that there are other 
sellers in the market. Any such seller has an incentive to approach 
the buyer with a liability rule contract priced at 7.50. The potential 
second seller would make an expected profit of 3.50 at the 7.50 
price: bid of 12 from the later buyer less production cost of 6 and 
less expectation damages paid to the initial buyer of 2.50. The 
buyer's expectation, were this contract breached, would rise to 
10 - 7.50 = 2.50, which exceeds the gain he would make under the 
contract the initial seller offered. Hence, the buyer would accept 
the lower priced liability rule contract. 
The market price for a liability rule contract would not be 7.50, 
however, because sellers would undercut any price above 7. For 
example, if a seller offered the liability rule contract at the 7.50 
price, another seller could attract buyers by charging 7.25.37 The 
competitive process would stop at 7. To see why, let a seller re 
37 
When the price is 7.25, the buyer's expectation is 2.75, so the seller realizes 
12 - 6 - 2.75 = 3.25. 
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duce the price for a liability rule contract to 6.50. The buyer's ex 
pectation then would be 10 - 6.50 = 3.50, so the seller would earn 
12 - 6 - 3.50 = 2.50. Recall that the seller could earn 3 under the 
specific performance contract. Hence, sellers would offer either the 
property rule contract at a price of 8, earning 3, or the liability rule 
contract at a price of 7, also earning 3. In sum, the equilibrium con 
tract prices are 7 when the rule (or contract) is damages and 8 
when the rule (or contract) is specific performance. 
The promisee/buyer's expected payoff also is invariant to the le 
gal remedy. When the buyer has a right to specific performance 
and the seller rejects trade, the buyer expects to realize his expec 
tation of 2 (10 - 8) plus 1 in a renegotiation. When the buyer has a 
right only to expectation damages, he expects to realize only his 
contractual expectation, but this now is 10 - 7 = 3. 
This example permits us to identify the mistake that critics of the 
expectation make. The critics incorrectly believe that the two 
remedies have different distributional consequences because they 
implicitly assume that sellers can charge property right prices—8 in 
the example—for liability rule contracts. The price, however, is a 
function of the rights the buyer actually has. Therefore, the two 
remedies have identical distributional consequences. We next gen 
eralize this example. 
Β. An Expectation Interest Model 
A risk neutral seller and a risk neutral buyer, functioning in a 
competitive market, agree to trade an item of personal property.38 
We begin with the liability rule contract. This contract contains 
three sets of terms. The "action terms" describe the item that the 
parties expect to trade and set out the delivery steps the seller is to 
take. The "transfer term" specifies what the seller must pay to the 
buyer if the seller does not deliver the item. The "price term" 
specifies what the buyer must pay to the seller if the parties trade 
the item. 
After the parties contract, they observe the realization of two 
random variables: the seller's cost to produce (or acquire) the item 
and the value the buyer attaches to the item. If the seller chooses 
38 
The competitive market assumption simplifies analysis. We later relax the as 
sumption to show that our conclusions apply in less competitive environments. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.238 on Wed, 12 Mar 2014 20:38:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1960 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 97:1939 
to trade, she tenders the item and the buyer pays the price. If the 
seller rejects trade, she pays the sum the contract's transfer term 
specifies. The timing of the model is as followsrt4: The state moves 
by choosing a default transfer term. The state's goal is to enact the 
term that maximizes parties' gains from trade. 
t°: The parties contract. At this time, they decide what transfer 
term to include in their contract. 
t1: The parties observe the seller's cost of complying with the 
contract's action terms and the value the buyer would derive from 
performance of those terms. 
t2: The seller chooses whether to trade or to transfer. If the seller 
trades, she tenders the item, and the buyer pays the price. If the 
seller rejects trade, then (a) the seller transfers to the buyer the 
sum the contract directs, but (b) if the law were to enforce property 
rule contracts and the parties were to use one, the parties would 
renegotiate to share the nontrading gain. 
Remedies sometimes are necessary to enforce the contracts we 
analyze. To see why, let Θ denote the set of possible states of the 
world that may obtain at t1. Partition this set into two subsets: θΑ 
and θτ. If the realized state θ that obtains at t1 is in ΘΑ, trade is effi 
cient (the buyer's value exceeds the seller's cost); if the realized 
state θ is in θτ, trade is inefficient (cost exceeds value). Parties 
should trade in the ΘΑ states, but the seller has an incentive to reject 
trade if her realized cost turns out to be lower than the buyer's 
value but above the contract price. Similarly, parties should reject 
trade in the θτ states, but the buyer would like to compel trade 
when his value turns out to be below the seller's cost but is above 
the price. Remedies are necessary to resolve these conflict cases. 
Parties know the mean, denoted C, of the distribution of possible 
values that the seller's realized cost can take. There are two cost 
categories. First, C can be the mean of possible bids from buyers 
whose valuations exceed those of the contract buyer. In this case, 
the seller's opportunity cost of performance is the foregone bid 
from a buyer with a higher valuation. Second, C can be the mean of 
possible seller production costs. In this case, the seller's opportu 
nity cost of performance is the foregone saving that not performing 
would have created. Parties also know the mean, denoted V, of the 
distribution of possible values that the contract buyer could realize 
from performance of the contract's action terms. Parties do not 
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contract when the buyer's expected value is below the seller's ex 
pected cost, so we assume that V exceeds C. 
In the efficient ex post state ΘΑ, the seller's expected cost is as 
sumed to be the low CL and the buyer's expected ΘΑ value is as 
sumed to be the high VH. Thus, at t° the expected gain from trading 
the item is VH - CL. We sometimes refer to this expected gain as a 
"surplus" and denote it Sa. Trade is inefficient if the ex post state θ 
is in θτ; then the seller's realized cost exceeds the buyer's realized 
value. Denote the seller's expected θτ cost as the high CH and the 
buyer's expected θτ value as the low VL. Thus, at t the expected 
"gain" from not trading the item is St = CH 
- VL. This is the ex 
pected saving—the nontrading gain—when the seller rejects ineffi 
cient trade. The probability that trade is efficient—θ ε ΘΑ—is de 
noted ßa; the probability that trade is inefficient—θ ε θτ—is denoted 
ßt: ßa + ßt = 1- The buyer's realized value is denoted v, the seller's 
realized cost is c, and the contract price is p. Parties make contracts 
to realize trading gains, not to speculate on future states of the 
world. Therefore, we assume that parties expect the trading surplus 
to exceed the nontrading surplus and expect the probability of 
trade to exceed the probability of not trading.39 We also make two 
assumptions in addition to the five set out in the Introduction: (f) 
neither party is liquidity constrained; and (g) parties have equal 
bargaining power at the renegotiation stage.40 
II. Sharing Through the Price or Through a 
Renegotiation 
Part II does three things. First, it shows, consistent with prior 
analyses, that a principal virtue of liability rule protection of the 
expectation interest is that it achieves ex post efficiency without 
renegotiation. This is not a serious plus when renegotiation is cost 
less, as we initially assume, but becomes important later, when we 
show how transaction costs reduce renegotiation's efficacy. Second, 
Part II shows that promisees would do no better, on the regnant as 
sumptions, were the law to protect the expectation with a property 
rule. This showing implies that the property right remedies are no 
39 
Formally, Sa > S, and ßa ε [Vi, 1]. 40 
We later relax assumption (f) and attempt to motivate assumption (b) (parties 
know what their contracts do). See infra Subsection II.E and II.F.2. 
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better grounded theoretically than the expectation remedy. Third, 
Part II argues that parties prefer the expectation remedy when 
some of the assumptions that now govern debate are relaxed. 
A. An Efficient Transfer Term 
The liability rule contract permits the promisor to reject trade if 
she makes a transfer to the promisee. An efficient transfer term 
would ensure in expectation that parties trade if and only if the 
value the buyer realizes from trade exceeds the seller's cost (that is, 
if ν > c). Let the state, which moves first, choose a default transfer 
term, denoted r, that requires the seller to pay the buyer's realized 
expectation if the seller rejects trade: r = ν - p. Suppose that the 
seller's cost turns out to exceed the price. If the parties' contract 
does not change the legal default, the seller accepts trade if her loss 
from trading is less than the transfer the default requires her to 
make. The seller trades, that is, if c - ρ < r = ν - ρ, or if ν > c, and 
she rejects trade when ν < c. Thus, under the default, r, parties real 
ize without renegotiation the higher of the two possible contracting 
surpluses: the trading gain when trade is efficient; and the nontrad 
ing gain when trade is inefficient. A state that chooses damage 
rules in order to maximize the parties' gains from trade would se 
lect the transfer term r as the default unless parties would reject it. 
Β. Parties' Contracting Preferences" 
The contract price divides a deal's expected surplus according to 
the parties' bargaining powers. The buyer, we assume, can com 
mand α of a transaction's expected surplus, where 0 < a< 1. The 
price thus awards the seller 1 - α of the surplus.42 Importantly, bar 
41 
Parties may contract in the cases we analyze if there is no perfect substitute for the 
seller's performance or to insure themselves against any disruption costs that the fail 
ure to trade could cause. Regarding the latter motivation, parties sometimes contract 
to ensure themselves stable sources of supply rather than risk having to make spot 
purchases in volatile markets. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Market Dam 
ages, Efficient Contracting, and the Economic Waste Fallacy, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 
1610,1643^17 (2008). 42 
Buyers receive all of the expected surplus in competitive markets. To see why, re 
call that the buyer realizes his value less the price (v - p). In competitive markets, 
price is competed down to cost. Thus, the buyer actually realizes value less cost (v 
- c), 
which is the entire surplus. In the model, then, α = 1 when the market is competitive 
and falls as competition declines. 
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gaining power is determined exogenously.43 Denote the expected 
surplus under a contract as Z. Then the bargaining power parame 
ter α divides Z, but since parties cannot affect the magnitude of a, 
they choose the non-price terms to maximize Z. We have just 
shown that the transfer term r permits parties always to realize the 
higher of the two possible contracting gains without renegotiation. 
Hence, parties would accept r as the legal default transfer term.44 
C. A Property Rule Contract 
A property rule contract, were it enforceable, would contain ac 
tion terms and a price but lack a transfer term. Rather, the buyer 
would have a contract right to performance of the action terms. To 
see how this contract would function, assume that there is no per 
formance right but instead the contract's transfer term requires the 
seller to pay r = oo if she rejects trade. The buyer's gain from trade 
would be ν - p. The seller can restrict the buyer to this payoff by 
trading, at a loss of c - p. Therefore, the parties would renegotiate 
to excuse the seller, though r is infinitely large, if the seller can 
make a transfer to the buyer that gives the buyer a payoff that ex 
ceeds his trading payoff and that gives the seller a payoff that is less 
43 
Bargaining power sometimes is determined structurally, as when a market is com 
petitive. When both parties have bargaining power, we assume the bargaining is Nash: 
each party's relative bargaining power is a function of the parties' disagreement 
points and their discount rates. The party who can do better outside of the deal com 
monly does better in it because the other party cannot persuade her to deal unless he 
accepts a contract that permits her to beat her outside offer. The more patient party 
also does better because she can wait longer for a favorable offer. Bargaining power is 
exogenously determined in these cases because neither party can affect either the 
value of her counter-party's outside option or the rate at which the counter-party dis 
counts that value. 
44 
Parties do not make relation-specific investments in our model because the law's 
critics do not consider these investments. The model is consistent with efficient in 
vestment incentives, however. When the buyer's value is verifiable, as is assumed in 
the literature we discuss, contracts can take forms such that the expectation interest 
remedy—that is, the transfer term r—induces the parties to invest optimally. For re 
views and analysis, see MacLeod, supra note 22, at 602-03; Susanne Ohlendorf, Ex 
pectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment, 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 
1608, 1608 (2009); Alexander Stremitzer, Standard Breach Remedies, Quality 
Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments, 28 J.L. Econ. & Org. (forthcoming 2012). 
When the expectation is not verifiable, penalties sometimes are necessary to induce 
efficient investment. See Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Con 
tracts, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 33,34-37 (2003). 
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than her (negative) trading payoff. Any such transfer, x, that would 
permit the seller to exit thus must satisfy the inequalities ν - 
ρ < χ < c - p. The left-hand side of this expression holds that the 
buyer's payoff from permitting seller exit exceeds his expectation; 
the right-hand side holds that the seller pays a transfer that is less 
than the loss she would have incurred by trading. As is apparent, 
both inequalities cannot be satisfied unless ν < c (that is, trade is 
inefficient). 
This analysis supports two conclusions. To understand the first, 
realize that a promisee with a property right has as much power as 
a promisee who can enforce a very large transfer term. In both 
cases, the promisee can impose heavy costs on a promisor who re 
fuses to trade or to pay. Therefore, in both cases, the promisor will 
either trade or offer the promisee a transfer for permission to avoid 
trade. No transfer that both parties will accept exists, we have just 
seen, unless trade would have been inefficient. The promisor thus 
trades under a property rule contract when trade is efficient and 
makes a monetary transfer to avoid trade when trade is inefficient, 
just as promisors do today under liability rule protection of the ex 
pectation. The second conclusion is that the buyer's renegotiation 
payoff under a property rule contract exceeds his trading gain: 
χ > ν - p. 
Before discussing how parties share gains under liability rule and 
property rule protection of the expectation, we note that these 
conclusions hold for every type of contract that creates a right in 
the promisee to performance of a contract's action terms. The 
buyer's share of the non-trading gain is the same under each of 
them. The buyer's right, it is sometimes suggested, should be pro 
tected by awarding him punitive damages when the seller fails to 
perform.45 We have just shown, however, that a penalty of infinity 
functions as the specific performance remedy functions. Neither 
remedy causes the seller to perform inefficiently, and under both 
she exits by paying to the buyer a sum that is between the buyer's 
gain from trade and the seller's loss from trade. Similarly, a seller 
would trade inefficiently if the buyer's disgorgement remedy trans 
ferred the full gain from not trading to the buyer; but again the 
45 
E.g., Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, supra note 5, at 731, 752 
53. 
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seller escapes inefficient trade by paying to the buyer a sum that is 
between the buyer's trading payoff and the seller's disgorgement 
loss. Invariance among remedies exists because the buyer's payoff 
from renegotiation is a function of (i) the non-trading gain; (ii) the 
trading gain; and (iii) the buyer's bargaining power in the renego 
tiation.46 These variables do not vary with the particular remedy the 
buyer invokes to trigger a renegotiation. Hence, the buyer's payoff 
is the same under all property rule contracts. 
D. Surplus Sharing and the Buyer's Expected Return 
1. Intuition 
A property rule contract gives the buyer bargaining power ex 
post because he can compel the seller to perform. A market gives 
the buyer bargaining power ex ante because he can buy from the 
seller who offers the best terms. To compare the payoffs that these 
different forms of bargaining power imply, we assume that the law 
enforces both contract types. Let a seller offer the liability rule 
contract, which does not convey a property right, but charge the 
buyer the property rule price. This price permits the seller to re 
cover three categories of expected cost: (a) the seller's cost of trade 
if the seller trades; (b) the seller's cost of paying the buyer's expec 
tation if the seller rejects trade; and (c) the additional cost that the 
rejecting seller later incurs because she must pay the buyer a share 
of the non-trading gain in order to exit. Since the payment of this 
share is a cost, it is reflected in the property rule price. 
Liability rule contracts with such property rule prices would not 
exist in equilibrium, however. Sophisticated buyers anticipate the 
possibility of two possible gains: one that trade creates and the 
other that rejecting trade creates. If one seller offered a liability 
46 
The parties' bargaining powers ex post differ from their ex ante powers because 
their disagreement points change. The seller, in a renegotiation, can restrict the buyer 
to his expectation by trading and the buyer may lack immediate access to the market 
to replace the seller's performance. Hence, both parties have bargaining power later. 
In the model's terminology, it is 0 < α < 1 for the buyer and is 1 - α > 0 for the seller. 
For convenience, we let α = Vi. For an analysis of how a buyer's bargaining power can 
fall after making a contract, see Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: 
An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. Legal Stud. 271, 
310-11,316(1992). 
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rule contract at a property rule price, a competing seller could get 
the business of a sophisticated buyer in either of two ways. First, 
she can retain the price but offer the buyer a property rule con 
tract, which would permit the buyer to get specific performance or 
disgorgement. Buyers prefer property rule contracts at property 
rule prices to liability rule contracts at property rule prices because 
the property rule contract permits the buyer later actually to ac 
quire a share of the non-trading gain. Second, the putative com 
petitor can offer the liability rule contract at a lower price. 
We focus on price reductions. Recall that the property rule price 
aggregates three cost categories. When a seller charges a property 
rule price without offering a property right, however, category (c) 
is a profit, not a cost: it is the buyer's share of the non-trading gain 
that the buyer actually lacks the power to compel. As the introduc 
tory example showed, this profit will be competed away. Another 
way to put this result is that price equals cost in competitive mar 
kets. Hence, price under the liability rule contract aggregates only 
cost categories (a) and (b) above. 
The buyer's expected payoff, therefore, is invariant to the con 
tract type he accepts. Under the property rule contract, the buyer 
pays a price that includes the buyer's expected share of the non 
trading gain, but he later recovers back this share in the renegotia 
tion that he is able to force. Under the liability rule contract, the 
buyer cannot force a renegotiation, but the price is lower by the 
buyer's expected renegotiation share. The value the buyer would 
realize from the seller's performance is unaffected by the remedy 
he accepts. It thus follows that the buyer's expected payoff is the 
same under both contract types. Subsection II.D.2 next sets out this 
reasoning formally and Subsection II.D.3 uses the analysis to cre 
ate a better-grounded numerical example. Readers for whom the 
intuition is sufficient can turn directly to Section II.E, which dis 
cusses the results. 
2. Analysis 
A buyer's expected return is the value he expects the goods to 
create for him less the price he has to pay. In the model here, the 
buyer's value is exogenous. For example, his value may be a func 
tion of demand for the end product the buyer plans to sell. The 
contract type the buyer accepts thus can affect his expected return 
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only through the remedy it creates and the price. Sellers in com 
petitive markets earn a return on invested capital, which is re 
flected in their costs, but otherwise earn zero profits. We next solve 
for the prices under the two contract types on this zero-profit as 
sumption. 











The first term on the right-hand side of Expression (1) is the 
seller's expected return from trade: the property rule price, de 
noted ppr, less the cost the seller incurs in the trading state. The en 
tire term in braces is the payoff the seller must make to the buyer 
in the non-trading state. The first term in braces is the buyer's non 
trading state expectation: his low value less the price. The first 
bracketed term is the seller's saving from rejecting trade—her high 
non-trading cost less the price. The second bracketed term is the 
buyer's expectation, which must be deducted because the seller 
must pay it, as is reflected in the first term in braces. All of the 
terms in braces are multiplied by ßt, the probability that the parties 
do not trade. The bracketed terms also are multiplied by a, the 
buyer's bargaining power, because those terms reflect the payment 
the buyer can exact to excuse the seller from trading. The brack 
eted terms simplify to cH - vL, which equals St, the surplus from not 
trading. Using this simplification, that ßa + ßt = 1, and letting Ex 
pression (1) equal zero to reflect the competitive market assump 
tion, the property rule price is: 
(2) Ppr= ßaCL + ß.VL + ßt[«(St)]· 
The first two terms in Expression (2) represent the seller's ex 
pected cost if the parties trade and the seller's expected cost of 
paying the buyer's expectation if the parties do not trade. The last 
term is the expected cost of the bribe the seller must later pay to 
the buyer in order to avoid trade: that is, the expected value of the 
non-trading gain the buyer's bargaining power under a property 
rule contract permits him to capture. This bribe is reflected in the 
price because it is a cost the seller incurs under the property rule 
contract. 
The seller's expected return under the liability rule contract is: 
(3) Es(îTei) = ßa(pei 
- cL) - ßt(vL - pei). 
The first term on the right-hand side is the expected value of the 
seller's gain from trade: the liability rule contract price, denoted pei, 
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less the seller's cost in the trading state. The second term is the 
buyer's non-trading state expectation, which the seller must pay 
when she rejects trade. Letting Expression (3) equal zero, the ex 
pectation interest price under the liability rule contract is: 
(4) Pei = ßaCL + P,VU 
Again, the first two terms reflect the seller's expected trading 
cost and the seller's expected cost of paying the buyer's expecta 
tion. There is no third term, however, because under the liability 
rule contract the seller need not pay a bribe in order to exit. Com 
paring Expressions (2) and (4), the equilibrium price under the li 
ability rule contract is lower than the price under the property rule 
contract by the buyer's expected share of the non-trading gain. 
Under the liability rule contract, the buyer expects to realize his 
value less the liability rule price: 
(5) EB(7tei) - V - pei. 
Under the property rule contract, the buyer expects to realize his 
value less the property rule price and plus his possible share of the 
non-trading gain: 
(6) ΕΒ(πρΓ) = V - Ppr + ßt(aSt). 
The buyer's expected return does not vary with the contract type 
he accepts: that is, Expression (5) minus Expression (6) equals 
zero.47 Regarding the intuition, the buyer's expected value is the 
same under both contract types. Hence, in this model, the buyer is 
indifferent between receiving his value less the low-liability rule 
price, or receiving his value less the high property rule price but 
later recovering the difference between the prices in a renegotia 
tion. 
Finally, although it is convenient to assume a competitive market 
in demonstrating this result, the result applies broadly. The model 
is driven by three factors: (i) the buyer has bargaining power ex 
post; (ii) the seller can charge a price that at least equals her ex 
pected cost; and (iii) the seller's ability to price ex ante is con 
strained by the existence of other potential suppliers. The first two 
of these factors hold everywhere and the last holds unless a seller 
has strong monopoly power. Hence, buyers are indifferent between 
47 
Doing this subtraction, we have (V - pel) 







calling that ppr 
= pei + ß,(aSt), Expression (5) 
- Expression (6)= 0. 
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the two contract types in workably as well as perfectly competitive 
environments.48 
3. An Example 
In the example, which uses the competitive market assumption, 
the seller's cost will be 100 with probability 0.8 and 150 with prob 
ability 0.2. Hence, the seller's expected cost is C = 110. The buyer's 
value will be 145 with probability 0.8 and 120 with probability 0.2. 
Hence, the buyer's expected value, V, is 140. Since V > C, the par 
ties contract. The parties trade with probability 0.8 because then 
the buyer's value is 145 and the seller's cost is 100. The buyer has 
50% of the bargaining power if the parties renegotiate. In the 
model's notation, cH = 150; cL = 100; vH = 145; vL = 120; α = 0.5; 
ßa = 0.8; and ßt = 0.2. The surplus if the seller rejects trade is 
S, = cH - vL = 30. 
If the parties write a liability rule contract, the price, from Ex 
pression (4) above, is pei = 0.8(100) + 0.2(120) = 104. If the parties 
write a property rule contract, the price, from Expression (2), is 
ppr = 0.8(100) + 0.2(120) + 0.2[0.5(30)] = 107. The buyer's expected 
gain under the liability rule contract, from Expression (5), is 140 - 
104 = 36. The buyer's expected gain under the property rule con 
tract, from Expression (6), is 140 + 3 -107 = 36. The buyer thus is 
indifferent between agreeing to pay 104 under the liability rule 
contract but recovering nothing later, or agreeing to pay 107 under 
the property rule contract but expecting with probability 0.2 to re 
cover 15 back in a later renegotiation. The price adjusts to reflect 
48 
We have verified this reasoning by solving for the contract prices under the as 
sumptions that bargaining power is exogenous and that the seller can price so as to 
extract a share of the expected surplus from transacting. The price difference again 
equals ßt[a(St)]. The most common workably competitive environment probably oc 
curs when sellers engage in differentiated goods, Bertrand competition. In such mar 
kets, many sellers exist, each of whom differs on a dimension relevant to the buyer. 
For example, the buyer is purchasing a machine. Seller/manufacturers differ in their 
ability to match the machine to the buyer's needs. Hence, the seller that the buyer ini 
tially picks can capture some of the surplus that the buyer realizes from dealing with 
her rather than with the buyer's second choice. The phrase "Bertrand" indicates that 
the sellers compete on price. If the initial seller demands too much of the expected 
surplus from contracting with her, the buyer will turn to another seller, who would 
charge less. Competition thus again constrains a seller's bargaining power. 
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the contract the buyer accepts, so the buyer makes the same ex 
pected gain under both contract types. 
E. Critiques of Contract Law and Surplus Sharing49 
It is helpful to review the results before discussing positive cri 
tiques. We show: (a) parties trade when trade is efficient and reject 
trade when it is inefficient under both liability rule protection of 
the expectation and under every form of property rule protection; 
and (b) a profit-maximizing promisee, on the analysis so far, would 
accept either the equilibrium liability rule contract or the equilib 
rium property rule contract because both contract types generate 
the same expected gain. It follows that liability rule protection of 
the expectation cannot be uniquely justified on efficiency or distri 
butional grounds. It also follows that property rule protection can 
not be uniquely justified on efficiency or distributional grounds. 
Analyses must go further. 
Before turning to possible "second-order" justifications for pre 
ferring one or the other remedy, we consider two criticisms of our 
conclusions. The first criticism holds that parties focus only on ne 
gotiated terms at the contracting stage. Parties necessarily negoti 
ate over the action terms and the price. Promisees have no con 
scious intention regarding other terms, such as the default remedy 
term. These become relevant only when a party rejects trade. Sell 
ers facing inattentive promisees have an incentive to offer liability 
rule contracts at property rule prices, thereby appropriating to 
themselves the entire non-trading gain. 
We rule out this result by assuming that promisees know what 
their contracts do. We motivate this assumption as follows. There 
are two types of contracts in our model: the liability rule contract 
and the property rule contract. The liability rule contract has (a) 
action terms; (b) a transfer term; and (c) a price. The property rule 
contract, if enforceable, would have (a) action terms; (b') a grant of 
a property right; and (c) a price. The price in the liability rule con 
tract is a function of terms (a) and (b); the price in the property 
rule contract is a function of terms (a) and (b'). A sophisticated 
promisee would ask what the contract price buys him. He cannot 
45 
We focus here on positive concerns with these critiques. Part III presents a more 
complete analysis of the moral critiques. 
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rationally answer this question without considering both the (a) 
terms and the (b) term. Put more directly, the assumption that par 
ties are sophisticated and the assumption that parties ignore the 
remedy term are inconsistent. 
A more general way to put this point is to recall that every term 
of U.C.C. Article 2, except those governing good faith and fair 
dealing, is a default that can be varied "by agreement." Many of 
these default terms, such as those regulating remedies, warranties, 
and offer and acceptance, importantly affect a party's contracting 
payoff. Thus, a claim that parties pay attention only to negotiated 
terms is a claim that commercial parties routinely are unaware of 
the financial consequences of the contracts they make. Such a 
claim should be supported by more evidence than now exists. 
A better criticism of our model would hold that sophisticated 
promisees know what their contracts do but claim that there also 
exist "naive" promisees, who cannot reason as we assume and thus 
who focus only on prices and negotiated performance terms. If 
enough naive buyers exist, promisor sellers would maximize profits 
by exploiting them at the cost of losing the business of the sophisti 
cated buyers. The claim that contract law excludes promisees from 
sharing in the non-trading gain because the law protects only the 
promisee's expectation therefore holds if too few sophisticated 
buyers exist to compel sellers to charge competitive prices.50 
It is an open question whether there are enough sophisticated 
buyers. Most contract theories, including those implicit in argu 
ments that contract law should give promisees a property right in 
trade, assume that commercial promisees have the ability to choose 
action terms that are in a promisee's best interest; for if promisees 
make irrational choices regarding the contract's substance, there 
seems not to be a well-grounded property right to protect. Choos 
50 
The text uses the phrase "too few" because, when parties do not bargain at the 
contracting stage, sellers may offer optimal contracts in markets that both sophisti 
cated and naive buyers enter when there are enough sophisticated buyers. See Alan 
Schwartz, How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?, 37 J. Legal Stud. 131, 
131 (2008). Irrationality plays a smaller role when there is ex ante bargaining. See 
John A. List & Daniel L. Millimet, The Market: Catalyst for Rationality and Filter of 
Irrationality, 8 B.E. J. Econ. Analysis & Pol'y, no. 1, 2008, at 3, available at 
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol8/issl/art47/ ("[W]e conclude that individual irra 
tionality as measured in our experiment does not unduly influence aggregate effi 
ciency in bilateral bargaining markets."). 
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ing the action terms, however, requires forward-looking thinking. 
A promisee who is looking ahead should realize that trade under a 
contract is uncertain and thus ask how his contract regulates the 
no-trade possibility. This reasoning suggests that competition 
works as explicated above, on the assumptions that the critics 
make. The issue is empirical, however. 
A second criticism is that our "equivalence result" rests on the 
parties' ability to renegotiate to the efficient ex post state. This 
ability, in turn, exists only when parties are symmetrically informed 
about the relevant economic variables at the renegotiation stage. 
Contract theory models commonly assume that uncertainty re 
solves ex post—that symmetric information exists—but it is a sepa 
rate question how realistic this assumption is. When it fails to hold, 
which may be often, renegotiation results are indeterminate in 
general. Analysts thus cannot reject the claim that different reme 
dies can generate different contracting payoffs. 
This criticism of the equivalence result is out-of-bounds. A de 
bate about whether contract law should protect the expectation 
with a liability rule or a property rule presupposes that courts can 
enforce a liability rule. Courts cannot know more than what parties 
tell them. Hence, if parties never become symmetrically informed 
about the cost and value variables, courts cannot award expecta 
tion damages.51 Rather, specific performance is the only imple 
mentable remedy.52 The expectation debate thus is relevant only 
over the domain in which parties, and hence courts, are symmetri 
cally informed at the renegotiation stage. We assume symmetric in 
formation ex post both because sometimes the assumption holds 
and also because to reject the assumption is to reject the issue. 
51 
This statement is too broad because courts can protect the expectation with mar 
ket damages when thick markets exist: a court can conveniently recover contract and 
market prices. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 41, at 1663, 1667. The text's state 
ment holds for the many cases in which implementing a damages remedy requires 
courts to know values or costs. 
52 
The disgorgement remedy also requires courts to know the economic variables. 
To see why, consider how disgorgement would work in the example that begins Part 
II. The seller's gain from selling to buyer two is the difference between the second 
buyer's bid and the contract price. Denote that gain as g = p2 
- 
p,. Then the buyer's 
disgorgement remedy would be d = (v 
- 
p,) + g. The first term is the buyer's contrac 
tual expectation (value less price) and the second term is the gain the seller must dis 
gorge. A court could not order disgorgement without knowing v. 
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We now turn to the dual performance hypothesis. Our claim is 
that the dual performance hypothesis is plausible because pro 
misees often prefer sharing through a price reduction to sharing 
through a property right-induced renegotiation. We next attempt 
to defend this claim. 
F. The Buyer Promisee's Preferences 
In the pure world of the model, which reflects the pure world of 
the critics, the buyer is indifferent between receiving a share of the 
surplus from rejecting trade in the form of a price reduction under 
the liability rule contract or in the form of an ex post transfer pay 
ment under the property rule contract. We now relax some of the 
model's assumptions, to argue that sharing through the price would 
be the more common preference. 
1. Ex Ante: Costly Contracting 
Critics and supporters of liability rule protection for the expecta 
tion commonly assume that contracting is costless. When this unre 
alistic assumption is relaxed, the liability rule contract becomes 
more attractive because it is cheaper to create. There are two rea 
sons. To understand the first reason, realize that the cost of creat 
ing a contract is increasing in the number of contingencies that the 
contract requires to govern the parties' behavior.53 The liability rule 
contract conditions on fewer states of the world than the property 
rule contract. Under the former contract, the buyer pays the price 
if the seller trades, and the seller pays the transfer if she does not. 
Thus, there are two possible payoff relevant states under the liabil 
ity rule contract: trade or no trade. The property rule contract con 
ditions on as many as six payoff relevant states of the world, of 
which the first two are trade and no trade. If the seller rejects trade 
and retains the subject of sale, the buyer is entitled to specific per 
formance; if the seller has sold the subject of sale to a third party, 
the buyer is entitled to disgorgement. Hence, the property rule 
53 
For a deeper analysis, see Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, Rigidity, Dis 
cretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts, 92 Am. Econ. Rev. 798, 798 (2002); see 
also Ronald A. Dye, Costly Contract Contingencies, 26 Int'l Econ. Rev. 233, 233 
(1985) (focusing on contract cost increasing in the number of contingencies the con 
tract includes). 
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contract also conditions on the states "sale" or "no sale." Finally, if 
the promisor is quantity constrained—she cannot immediately ex 
pand output—she may be unable to perform for the promisee be 
cause she is performing for another. In this case, specific perform 
ance is impossible and disgorgement may be impossible as well 
(because the seller is not earning a pure profit on the second sale), 
so the promisee is restricted to damages. Thus, the property rule 
contract also may condition on the states "disabled" or "not dis 
abled." In consequence of this last possibility, the contract must 
have a transfer term, just as the liability rule contract does. 
The second reason holds that the pricing problem is more costly 
to solve under the property rule contract. Comparing Expressions 
(2) and (4) above, under the liability rule contract the seller, in or 
der to price, must predict her low cost and the buyer's low value. 
Under the property rule contract, the seller also must predict the 
non-trading state gain and the parties' renegotiation bargaining 
power shares. Pricing the property rule contract thus is more com 
plex, and so more costly, than pricing the liability rule contract. 
To summarize, though the value the buyer receives from trade is 
independent of contractual form, his net payoff may not be. The 
property rule contract price will often be higher than the liability 
rule contract price by the additional cost of writing and pricing the 
property rule contract. Buyers prefer the liability rule contract 
when it yields the same payoff as the property rule contract but is 
cheaper to create. 
2. Ex Post 
The background idea is that parties' interests change as they 
move from the ex ante to the ex post stage. Their interests are 
harmonious at the contracting stage: they then anticipate that they 
may realize the relatively large trading gain, and so they share a 
desire to reach agreement.54 The parties' interests are adverse at 
the ex post stage, however: they know then that they will not trade 
and that they are engaged in a zero-sum bargaining game. Every 
54 
Recall our assumptions that the probability of trade exceeds the probability of not 
trading and that the trading gain exceeds the saving from rejecting trade. The parties' 
interests are not identical: sellers prefer high prices, for example, and buyers low. But 
because contracting creates a surplus, the parties play a positive sum game. They 
share an interest in "getting to yes." 
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dollar that the buyer receives as damages or from a renegotiation is 
a dollar lost to the seller. 
In the model above, the zero-sum nature of the ex post game did 
not matter because the seller was assumed able to make whatever 
transfer the contract implied. A seller may become liquidity 
constrained after a contract is made, however. Such a seller's reluc 
tance to transfer is increasing in the amount at stake. Under the li 
ability rule contract, the buyer's ex post payoff is vL 
- pei, his non 
trading state valuation less the liability rule contract price. In the 
example in Subsection II.D.3, that payoff is 120 -104 = 16. Under 
the property rule contract, the buyer's ex post payoff is vL 
Ppr + aSt, the buyer's valuation less the property rule contract price 
plus the buyer's share of the non-trading gain. In the example 
above, that payoff is 120 - 107 + 15 = 28. 
The seller's reluctance to pay is heightened when, as sometimes 
happens, her costs are correlated across contracts. A seller may 
face bankruptcy if her costs on many contracts turn out to exceed 
the prices she has charged. Since more dollars are involved under 
the property rule contract, a seller party to this contract is more 
likely to fight even harder to avoid her obligations in the correlated 
cost case. Turning to the contracting stage, parties seldom are 
aware of their counter-party's complete financial circumstances. 
Buyers under both contract types thus face risk that their seller will 
turn out to be liquidity constrained. This risk is lower under the li 
ability rule contract than under the property rule contract because 
there is less at stake in the no-trade state under the liability rule 
contract. For this reason also, the buyer is inclined to prefer the li 
ability rule contract. 
In addition, the model above assumed that the seller makes a 
transfer immediately after she rejects trade and that renegotiation 
occurs instantaneously. In a more realistic framework, the seller 
has an incentive to delay, and renegotiations take time. The buyer 
may be disadvantaged by delay if he expected to use the contrac 
tual transfer to purchase a substitute or to pay off a lender. Delay 
is more likely when the buyer requires a renegotiation to be paid. 
The liability rule contract thus poses a lower delay risk. 
To sum up these ex post considerations, a seller who is finan 
cially constrained has an incentive to resist payment and all sellers 
have an incentive to delay payment. Resistance or delay may take 
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the form of a claim that the seller made a conforming tender that 
the buyer unreasonably rejected or that her cost increases were 
sufficiently material as to make performance impractical or that 
the buyer was not ready to receive timely delivery. Such strategic 
behavior is more likely to occur, or be more serious, under the 
property rule contract. Therefore, ex ante and ex post considera 
tions would cause many buyers to prefer the liability rule contract 
if the market offered both contract types. 
We summarize the analysis in two Propositions: 
• Proposition 1: Current contract law permits a promisee to 
share in the gain that a promisor's rejection of trade cre 
ates just as fully as he could share if he had a property 
right in the promisor's performance. 
• Proposition 2: If contract law were to make liability rule 
protection of the expectation the default, the typical 
promisee would let the default stand when the promisee 
could prove his expectation.55 
We make two further comments. First, a promisee's gross payoff 
is the same under either contract type, so parties prefer the con 
tract that yields the highest net payoff. The liability rule contract 
yields the highest net payoff because it is cheaper to create and to 
enforce. This analysis supports the dual performance hypothesis. 
The promisee prefers the liability rule contract, under which the 
promisor may choose whether to perform the contract's action 
terms or to make a transfer to the promisee in the amount of his 
expectation. Using the vocabulary of contract, the promisee agrees 
to give the promisor this choice, so that it is not a breach when the 
promisor exercises the choice in favor of paying money. This is the 
dual performance hypothesis. 
55 
Proposition 2 is phrased in this way because the expectation remedy is not a de 
fault but rather is the only available remedy. Courts will not enforce specific perform 
ance contracts and will not enforce liquidated damage clauses that fail reasonably to 
approximate the expectation. The Proposition follows from the model, which assumes 
that both contract types are enforceable and argues that buyers commonly would pre 
fer the liability rule contract. 
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Second, parties prefer the property rule contract when asymmet 
ric information prevents the promisee from proving his expecta 
tion.56 Our model assumes that parties observe the expected and 
the ex post values of the cost and value variables. Importantly, 
courts also can observe the promisee's ex post value: the gain the 
promisee would have realized had the parties traded.57 A court thus 
can award the promisee this value less the price when the promisor 
rejects both trade and transfer. Now suppose that the promisee's 
realized value is unverifiable. Then the court could not protect his 
expectation with a liability rule, and this creates an incentive for 
the promisor to reject both trade and transfer. Parties attempt to 
solve the verifiability problem today with liquidated damage 
clauses and suits for specific relief. Courts regulate the former and 
sometimes deny the latter. Our model shows that, in the asymmet 
ric information case, parties would benefit from the ability to con 
tract for an enforceable property right in the promisor's perform 
ance.58 
III. The Normative and Moral Structure of the 
Expectation Remedy 
The model above reveals that the dual performance hypothesis 
best explains how parties contract. Sellers make promises in the al 
ternative: to provide goods or services to a buyer or to make a 
monetary transfer to him in lieu of those goods or services. Ac 
cordingly, a promisor who voluntarily implements the transfer 
rather than the action terms does not breach her contract but per 
forms it; and a court that orders a recalcitrant promisor to make a 
56 
See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 57 
This is vL in the analysis above. 58 
One of us, in an earlier article, argued that courts should enforce specific per 
formance contracts and that specific performance should be available on demand. 
Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale L.J. 271, 271, 275-77 
(1979). In the modern lexicon, the latter claim held that specific performance should 
be the default. This claim primarily rested on the argument that (a) expectation dam 
ages—value less price—cannot be awarded when value is unverifiable; (b) market 
damages—the price of a substitute—cannot be awarded when no close substitutes ex 
ist; and (c) buyers seek specific performance only when factor (a) or factor (b) ob 
tains. As the text above shows, parties would choose property rule contracts in these 
cases. When the expectation is verifiable, a case not considered in the Schwartz arti 
cle, the analysis here shows that the liability rule contract is the better default. 
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transfer in the amount of the promisee's expectation actually is 
providing direct rather than substitutionary relief. 
Part III applies this understanding of the contractual relationship 
to defend the expectation remedy, understood in terms of the dual 
performance hypothesis, against two prominent philosophical criti 
cisms. On the analytic level, which concerns the law's normative 
structure, critics claim that the expectation remedy prices a breach 
of contract when the law instead should sanction the breach. 
Moreover, the legal price is set so low as to encourage breach 
rather than deter it. The intrinsic normative force of a contract law 
derives largely from its commitment to the performance of con 
tracts. Hence, the expectation remedy, by its slighting of perform 
ance, undermines the very legal order to which it belongs. On the 
level of morality, which concerns extra-legal ideals to which the law 
must answer, critics claim that the expectation remedy's slighting 
of performance violates the moral order governing the promises 
that contracts typically involve. 
As we show above, if promisee sophistication is assumed, the 
transfer term arises out of the parties' actual intentions and not just 
out of intentions that it would be rational for them to have or fair 
to impute to them. The transfer promise, that is, is as real, as much 
a product of the parties' actual intentions, as the promises that con 
stitute the action and price terms. The transfer promise is memori 
alized in the liability rule contract through the price term, which 
fixes the gain to buyers both of trade and of transfer (since the con 
tractual transfer equals the value that trade would have yielded less 
the price). We are tempted by the view that the transfer promise is 
express—that given the parties' negotiations, the price term just is 
another type of liquidated damages clause, which fixes transfers by 
reference to the named price (and its associated promisee surplus). 
Moreover, and critically, even if the transfer term is not express but 
rather implied from the price, it is implied in fact and not just in 
law. Part III uses these ideas to reinterpret the expectation remedy 
along lines that answer the remedy's critics. We show that on our 
interpretation liability rule protection of the expectation sanctions 
rather than prices breaches, when a breach is understood as the 
promisor's failure both to trade and to transfer. Hence, the expec 
tation remedy is consistent with the normative structure of contrac 
tual obligation. Moreover, we give the expectation remedy an in 
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terpretation that renders it formally consistent with the morality of 
promise. Finally, we argue that the style of sharing that the expec 
tation remedy introduces into the contract relation better serves 
the substantive values associated with the morality of promising 
than its alternatives, at least for the case of exchanges associated 
with commercial promises among sophisticated parties interacting 
at arm's length. 
A. The Analytic Claim 
Critics of the expectation remedy assert that the remedy is in 
consistent with the internal (or, as we sometimes say, immanent) 
normative structure of contract law. This is an analytic point rather 
than a moral one because it refers to the norms that arise inside 
contract rather than to contract's connection to moral values that 
reside outside of the law. We take up the morality of the expecta 
tion remedy in Section III.B below. In this Section, we first set out 
the leading analytic concerns, and we then show how our recon 
struction of the doctrine dissolves them. 
Critics argue that liability rule protection of the expectation re 
quires courts to price breach rather than sanction breach.59 Melvin 
Eisenberg thus remarks of the law's encouragement of refusals to 
trade: "if you don't wish to take a promised action when it is due, 
because all things considered you believe that the cost to you of 
taking the action would exceed the gain to the promisee, you 
shouldn't keep the promise,"60 Eisenberg adds that this "is not only 
an effect of the theory of efficient breach, it is a purpose of the 
theory."61 In its self-presentation, the theory of "efficient breach" 
59 
An early version of this claim appears in Friedmann, supra note 5, at 1. For more 
recent treatments of the claim, see Brooks, supra note 5, at 591-92; Jody S. Kraus, A 
Critique of the Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 423, 423 
(2007), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/scholarship/a 
critique-of-the-efficient-performance-hypothesis. 60 
Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, supra note 5, at 1012-13. 
Eisenberg has forcefully advocated for broader recourse to disgorgement. See 
Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, supra note 5, at 559. 61 
Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, supra note 5, at 1013. Here 
Eisenberg quotes Robert Birmingham, whose article introducing the idea of efficient 
breach observed that "[e]ncouragement of repudiation where profitable through 
elimination of moral content from the contract promise might also be socially desir 
able." Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic 
Efficiency, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 273,292 (1970). 
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encourages the thought, as E. Allan Farnsworth puts it, that "a 
'mere' breach of contract is not a 'wrong.'"62 
Critics (turning the theory of "efficient breach" against itself) in 
sist that this view is inconsistent with the idea that a contract con 
fers on the promisee a normative power to demand performance. 
The promisor wrongs the promisee by failing to respect that power. 
It is this wrong that should be sanctioned, a judgment that is the 
formal opposite of the expectation remedy's encouraging attitude 
towards "efficient breach." This critical judgment follows from the 
(erroneous) premise that a contract's action terms exhaustively 
characterize the promisor's obligations. Hence, money damages 
necessarily are substitutionary relief. It is common to hear critics, 
pursuing the thought that the phenomenon of "efficient breach" 
places the expectation remedy at odds with the normative structure 
of contract, echo approvingly the U.C.C.'s observation that "the 
essential purpose of a contract between commercial [parties] is ac 
tual performance and they do not bargain merely for a promise, or 
for a promise plus the right to win a lawsuit."63 
The ideas that a promisor who chooses transfer over trade is in 
breach and that liability rule protection of the expectation encour 
ages efficient breaches have surprising staying power, retaining 
their hold even on those who appear self-consciously to try to 
shake them loose.64 We now give two examples of prominent com 
62 
E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement 
Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 Yale L.J. 1339,1341 (1985). 63 
U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 1 (2003). A recent example is Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual 
Specific Performance, supra note 5, at 1007 n.71. Eisenberg cites an influential treatise 
on restitution, which claims that "[i]n most contracts,. . . [t]he expectation that de 
serves protection is the promised performance." 3 George Palmer, The Law of Resti 
tution § 15.9, at 440 (1978). This remark repeats the ambiguity in the U.C.C, com 
ment. 
64 
The modern originator of that theory, Robert Birmingham, introduced the argu 
ment for the expectation remedy's efficiency by writing that Répudiation of obliga 
tions should be encouraged where the promisor is able to profit from his default after 
placing his promisee in as good a position as he would have occupied had perform 
ance been rendered." Birmingham, supra note 61, at 284 (emphasis added). And 
Richard Posner, who has perhaps been the theory of efficient breach's most promi 
nent promoter, cast the efficiency of the expectation remedy as involving a similar as 
sault on the idea that the law requires contracts to be kept: "If [a promisor's] profit 
from breach would ... exceed the expected profit to the other party from completion 
of the contract, and if damages are limited to loss of expected profit, there will be an 
incentive to commit a breach. There should be." Richard Posner, Economic Analysis 
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mentators who acknowledge that a promisor's voluntary payment 
of the promisee's trading gain might constitute an alternative form 
of performance but also, in the same breath, characterize a court 
order to make the payment as a remedy for breach, not an alterna 
tive form of specific performance.65 Working through the examples 
helps to establish a contrast between the traditional theory of effi 
cient breach, which is subject to the analytic objections raised by 
critics, and the dual performance hypothesis, which is not. 
We begin with Holmes's famous suggestion that "[t]he duty to 
keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must 
pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else."66 As he took 
this view of the positive law, however, Holmes also supposed that 
his account put contract in tension with morality, which requires 
that promises be kept. Thus, Holmes's famous remark about con 
tract is sandwiched between less-noticed claims that the suggestion 
that contracts must be kept represents "the confusion between le 
gal and moral ideas,"67 propagated by "those who think it advanta 
geous to get as much ethics into the law as they can."68 Holmes's 
disdain for infusing law with ethics obscures the more important 
point, namely that Holmes did not follow his doctrinal insight that 
a contract is merely a legal obligation in the alternative backwards 
to its source, that the contract itself contains alternative promises, 
so that making the transfer that the contract requires is a form of 
performance. Holmes in his letters actually denied holding this 
view, complaining of "the persistence of the impression that I say 
of Law 57 (1st ed. 1972) (emphasis added). The most recent edition of Posner's Eco 
nomic Analysis of Law, though it reflects many changes in the characterization of the 
expectation remedy's efficiency, retains unchanged the thought that the conduct the 
remedy encourages, though efficient, involves a breach of contract, and therefore that 
the remedy itself provides substitutionary relief. 65 
A similar phenomenon appears in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 361 cmt. a 
(1981), which recognizes that a promise in the alternative gives promisors a privilege 
to transfer rather than to trade but also characterizes the transfer as a breach. 
66 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 462 (1897) 
[hereinafter Holmes, The Path of the Law]; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The 
Common Law 301 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881). 67 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 66, at 462. 68 
Id. 
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that a man promises either X [to trade] or to pay damages."69 In 
stead, Holmes insisted: "I don't think a man promises to pay dam 
ages in contract any more than in tort. He commits an act that 
makes him liable for them if a certain event does not come to pass, 
just as his act in tort makes him liable simpliciter."10 We embrace 
the expectation remedy as Holmes did, but reject his view of con 
tracts' promissory content, and hence also the view that the expec 
tation remedy puts contract law at odds with promissory morality. 
As we argue in greater detail below, the view that a contract con 
tains two promises entails that the expectation remedy puts as 
much ethics into legal doctrine as any reasonable alternative. 
Steven Shavell also has identified the doctrinal confusion associ 
ated with the idea of "efficient breach" only to be drawn back into 
it. Shavell observes that "because contracts are incomplete, that is, 
do not explicitly address many contingencies, one cannot automati 
cally say that a person has made a promise to ... do a particular 
thing in a problematic contingency even though the contract in a 
formal sense imposes an obligation to perform."71 Moreover, he ar 
gues, where the costs to the promisor of performing a contract in 
an unaddressed contingency exceed the value of performance to 
the promisee, the parties would not have required performance in 
that contingency if they had addressed it in their contract.72 Finally, 
Shavell observes: "We can deduce from the fact that the party in 
breach was willing to pay the expectation measure of damages that 
[performance would have cost her more than its value to her pro 
misee, so that]. . . the parties likely would not have stipulated per 
formance had they addressed the contingency that arose."73 
Because Shavell believes, plausibly, that "[I]f a contract does not 
address a contingency, then the moral duty of a party if the contin 
"Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Dec. 11, 1928), in 2 
Holmes-Pollock Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Sir Freder 
ick Pollock, 1874-1932, at 233 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942). 70 
Id. 
71 
Steven Shavell, Specific Performance Versus Damages for Breach of Contract: An 
Economic Analysis, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 831, 867 (2006). Shavell here distinguishes be 
tween a contract that is obligationally complete and a contract that actually is com 
plete. A contract that contains enough terms—for example, a price and a quantity— 
for a court to grant a remedy but that does not address "a problematic contingency" is 
only obligationally complete. 72 
Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 Emory L.J. 439,441 (2006). 73 
Id. 
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gency arises is determined by what the contract would have said 
had it provided explicitly for the contingency,"74 he concludes that 
the willingness of a promisor to pay expectation damages in a par 
ticular contingency implies that she has no moral obligation to per 
form [the action terms] in that contingency. 
Shavell goes on to claim, however, that the failure of the promi 
sor to perform those terms is a breach of contract.75 His account of 
the expectation remedy thus also observes that there is a tension 
between law and morals in this area, although it is the reverse of 
the tension on which critics of the positive law base their objections 
to the expectation remedy. 
In spite of this difference, Shavell's view that the tension exists, 
like more conventional views, rests on the incorrect premise that a 
contract that expressly specifies the action terms but not the trans 
fer term legally obligates the promisor to perform specifically the 
action terms. This is the premise that leads Shavell to characterize 
the refusal to perform those terms as a breach. The contract that 
we and Shavell analyze—what we call the liability rule contract— 
creates two legal obligations, however. Parties prefer a contract 
that gives the promisor the choice whether to trade or to transfer 
74 
Id. at 443. 
75 
Sometimes, these conflicting views about the promisor's obligations are expressed 
almost simultaneously: 
In other words, under the expectation measure of damages for breach, the seller 
will fail to perform in the same contingencies as the seller would be permitted 
not to perform in a complete contract. Accordingly, breach should not be char 
acterized as immoral under our assumptions. 
Id. at 449. 
In a footnote to this passage, Shavell asks, "[W]hat if a party breaches an explicit 
contingent provision of a contract and pays expectation damages?" Id. at 449 n.20. He 
worries that in this case the breach would be both immoral (because the breached 
provision is explicit) and not immoral (because the payment shows, the explicit provi 
sion to the contrary notwithstanding, that the parties would not have agreed to re 
quire action in this contingency). Shavell resolves the "apparent conflict" by wishing it 
away, claiming that "it cannot happen that a party would be willing to pay expectation 
damages to breach a truly explicit contingent provision." Id. He explains away obser 
vations of breaches in just such cases as involving various errors: that the expectation 
remedy is undercompensatory, for example, and so presents promisors with a possibil 
ity for opportunism; or that the provision in question has been misunderstood. Id. 
Our approach is simpler: we observe that a promisor may reasonably reserve for her 
self the right to pay expectation damages as an alternative form of performance even 
in contingencies in which, but for this reservation, she would have a primary duty to 
perform. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.238 on Wed, 12 Mar 2014 20:38:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1984 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 97:1939 
because that contract maximizes expected surplus more cheaply 
than would contracts that confer the trade/no-trade choice on the 
promisee. As a consequence, if parties were free to contract over 
remedies, they commonly would accept liability rule protection of 
the expectation remedy as their default. The tension in Shavell's 
analysis between law and morals thus dissolves because that ten 
sion rests on the incorrect premise that a liability rule contract does 
not create an obligation that governs in the no-trade contingency.76 
Shavell's mistake, which others also make, causes him to treat 
the payment of expectation damages as an epistemic tool rather 
than a normative feature of the parties' contractual relation. He 
thus writes that when the law makes expectation damages the rem 
edy for breach, then "we as onlookers know that when breach oc 
curs, it must be moral, for we can infer that the cost of performance 
must have been higher than the value of performance from the 
willingness of the seller to commit breach."77 But this suggests that 
if courts could measure costs and values directly, the expectation 
remedy might be done away with. Put another way, Shavell's epis 
temic approach to the expectation remedy cannot justify the view 
that it is a remedy, and so in his analysis expectation damages are 
an epistemic tool whose use does not rest on a normatively sound 
foundation.78 Our vindication of the dual performance supplies this 
foundation. When it is recognized that parties permit the promisor 
to make a transfer of the promisee's trading gain in return for the 
right not to trade when trading would be inefficient, the analytic 
criticism of liability rule protection falls. 
If expectation damages were merely substitutionary, courts that 
award them would leave promisees with something other than 
what they have bargained for, and hence (perhaps) would under 
mine contract's essential purpose. But because, as we have shown, 
expectation damages are in fact a species of direct relief—the spe 
76 
Shavell says, "In committing breach and paying damages, the promisor would be 
acting in exactly the way called for by a complete contract." Shavell, supra note 71, at 
867. The promisor acts in this way because the contract actually is complete. 77 
Shavell, supra note 72, at 450. 78 
For a similar argument, see Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral, supra 
note 5, at 1556-59. This is not the only criticism Shiffrin levels against Shavell. Shavell 
responds to her essay, although not, we believe, to the features of her argument that 
overlap with ours, in Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral 
Given the Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1569,1570 (2009). 
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cific enforcement of a contract's (implicit) transfer term—-courts 
that award them leave promisees with exactly one of the two possi 
ble things that they have bargained for.79 The expectation remedy, 
properly understood, therefore is consistent with the widely-held 
view that promisees bargain for performance, because perform 
ance is what the remedy delivers to them. The remedy also is con 
sistent with the U.C.C.'s devotion to vindicating promises with di 
rect relief, and as well with the analytic structure of contractual 
obligation that this devotion reflects.80 
79 
Here it is worth taking up an additional distinction in the margin. Ian Ayres and 
Gregory Klass rightly observe, in a context related to the current one, that "there are 
good reasons why promisors want to implicitly say that they intend to perform sim 
pliciter, rather than that they intend to perform or pay damages." Ian Ayres & Greg 
ory Klass, Promissory Fraud Without Breach, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 507, 513. Ayres and 
Klass marshal this observation against views, like ours, that understand contractual 
promises as (implicitly) promises to trade or to transfer. But although Ayres and 
Klass are right to observe that promisors typically intend to act, they do not suffi 
ciently recognize that promisors have two types of intentions: concerning what they 
intend to do and concerning what they intend to obligate themselves to do. And while 
contractual promisors may well (for the good reasons Ayres and Klass report) typi 
cally intend to trade, they have equally good reasons to obligate themselves either to 
trade or to transfer. So Ayres and Klass's accurate observation is not a valid objection 
to the view of contractual obligation that we develop. 
We note, finally, that local criticisms aside, our position seems to us friendly to 
Ayres and Klass's larger project, which, as their title suggests, is to explain how prom 
issory fraud might arise in tort even where there are no violations of contractual obli 
gations (in part because there might not be any contractual obligations to violate). 
Insofar as contract law focuses specifically on promisors' intentions to obligate, and 
promisors may have separate intentions concerning what they will do, Ayres and 
Klass's tort theory fits naturally into a gap that contract necessarily leaves unfilled. 80 
Jules Coleman recently argued that regarding a promisor's failure to perform a 
contract's action terms as a breach is consistent with the normative structure of contract, 
whereas regarding that failure as normatively innocent as long as the promisor performs 
the transfer term is not consistent. See Jules L. Coleman, Some Reflections on Richard 
Brooks's "Efficient Performance Hypothesis," 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 416 (2007), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/scholarship/some 
reflections-on-richard-brooks%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cefficient-performance 
hypothesis%E2%80%9D/. In Coleman's view, the expectation remedy follows a 
breach (hence the term "efficient breach"); therefore, the remedy functions as a sanc 
tion, remedying an action that the promisor has the capacity but not the right to do. 
Coleman rejects what he calls the option view—what we call the dual performance 
hypothesis—because the option view is inconsistent with the basic idea that contracts 
transfer to promisees the normative power to demand performance. His argument, 
however, assumes that parties typically make property rule contracts, under which the 
promisor agrees to perform the action terms unless some traditional ground for ex 
cuse obtains. We argue, to the contrary, that the liability rule contract is typical, and 
under it the promisee has only the power to require the promisor to pay if she refuses 
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Our views thus reverse the traditional economic approaches to 
the expectation remedy whose structure Shavell's arguments lu 
cidly reveal: whereas those approaches assimilate "efficient 
breach" to the absence of an obligation, we assimilate "efficient 
breach" to an obligation's performance; and whereas traditional 
economic theories of efficient breach understand the expectation 
remedy as a mechanism for identifying cases in which promisors 
are not obligated at all, we understand the expectation remedy as 
the direct enforcement of promisors' contracts. Rather than un 
dermining the immanent normative structure of contractual obliga 
tion, the expectation remedy directly vindicates that structure. 
Β. The Morality of Contract: Expectation Damages, the Wrong of 
Breach, and Contractual Solidarity 
Moral criticism of the expectation remedy adds to the analytic 
claim the moral claim that encouraging breach is inconsistent with 
the external-to-law values involved in the morality of promising. 
Principles of fidelity or faithfulness require promisors to do what 
they say they will do. It follows from this requirement that the 
promisee has a right to the promised performance. A promisor 
who pays (expectation) damages in lieu of trade therefore converts 
her promisee's interest in the contractual performance to her own 
benefit.81 Expectation damages, that is, permit a promisor to profit 
from something that no longer is hers. Specific performance or res 
titution (its cognate) are appropriate remedies because they, unlike 
damages, protect the promisee's right to the promised perform 
ance. 
These views are held by a broad range of commentators includ 
ing: economists who doubt the moral foundations of the traditional 
economic analysis of contract remedies,82 moralists who agree that 
the economic characterization of efficient breaches correctly cap 
tures the positive law,83 doctrinalists who emphasize that the expec 
to trade. If we are correct in this positive claim, the law's interpretive premise that 
typical contracts are in the alternative poses no more threat to the normative struc 
ture of contract than giving a promisor the right to perform either of any two acts. 81 
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule 245-60 
(1991); Friedmann, supra note 5, at 1. 82 
See Brooks, supra note 5, at 573-74. 83 
See, e.g., Friedmann, supra note 5, at 2. 
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tation remedy renders contract law less solicitous of promisees 
than tort law is of owners (there is no general tort doctrine of effi 
cient conversion analogous to the contract doctrine of efficient 
breach),84 and a small but perhaps growing number of courts who 
have suggested that a promisor who wrongfully breaches should be 
required to disgorge her gain under the restitutionary principle that 
a person should not profit from her wrong.85 
This association between the expectation remedy and a morally 
permissive approach to promise-breaking is mistaken. That a pro 
misor should be true to her words (and does wrong to break them) 
does not say what those words achieve: principles of fidelity are not 
principles of interpretation. The claim that the proceeds created by 
the rejection of an inefficient trade belong to the promisee or 
should be returned to him in "restitution" of a wrongful gain is not 
an independent argument for restitution but rather expresses an in 
terpretive conclusion about the content of the promisee's expecta 
tions. Part II shows that the interpretive conclusion is incorrect. A 
promisee can share in the gains from rejecting trade either through 
the lower price that a contract that permits the promisor to exit on 
payment of the promisee's trading gain enables or through the re 
negotiation that a promisee with a property right can force. In the 
typical case, the promisee's expected return from contracting is 
maximized under contracts that make alternative promises. Pro 
misees thus should be taken to have made such contracts unless the 
evidence proves otherwise. As a consequence, the default contract 
does not commit a promisor always to trade but rather to trade or 
to transfer the promisee's expectation, an efficient breach is not a 
true breach, and a promisor who rejects trade is not profiting from 
a wrong. Seen in this light, the expectation remedy is specific per 
formance of the promise to transfer that (as our model shows) con 
tributes as significantly to surplus sharing as the promise to trade. 
The moral critique of contract damages has yet to refute this view. 
84 
See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 81, at 253-54. 85 
Earthlnfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113, 119 (Colo. 
1995). 
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1. The Dual Performance Hypothesis and the Wrong of Breach 
There is a qualitative difference between a promisor who refuses 
to trade but voluntarily transfers, on the one hand, and a promisor 
who declines both to trade and to transfer on the other. The first 
promisor keeps her contract and honors her promissory obligation; 
the second breaches her contract and acts immorally. And when 
the expectation remedy is ordered by a court (as opposed to being 
volunteered by the promisor), then it is not just a price but a sanc 
tion—a form of redress for this wrong. This analysis raises the 
question how grave a wrong it is to decline both to trade and to 
transfer; relatedly, it raises the question whether punitive damages 
would be an appropriate additional sanction for that wrong. 
Parties would not contract for punitive damages and so would 
reject a punitive damage default in the circumstances modeled 
here.86 The analyses that yield this conclusion, however, assume ei 
ther that the promisor voluntarily transfers the expectation or that 
the promisee can costlessly recover it. The latter assumption is ob 
viously false. As a consequence, a promisor who rejects trade may 
also reject transfer on the impermissible ground that legal costs will 
deter a promisee's lawsuit. A contract theory approach to remedies 
is consistent with awarding punitive damages for such bad faith re 
fusals to transfer. 
The moral and doctrinal approach to contracts that this Part 
takes also may support punishing a true breach in bad faith. Our 
reconstruction of the doctrinal order surrounding the expectation 
remedy invites a new inquiry into the proper attitude for contract 
law to take towards true breaches. Far from encouraging breach, 
the expectation remedy (properly understood) re-emphasizes the 
seriousness with which the law treats contractual promises—it is an 
integral part of the law's commitment to enforce such promises 
(once the promises' contents have been properly understood). That 
the law takes such breaches seriously enough to remedy the wrong 
directly, by undoing it (by ensuring that one of the alternatives in 
the contractual promise to trade or to transfer is performed), 
86 
Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: 
An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 Yale L.J. 369, 372-73 (1990); 
see Edlin & Schwartz, supra note 44 (summarizing the literature). 
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makes it natural to ask whether the refusal to perform either alter 
native merits legal punishment. 
The question whether punitive damages are appropriate in the 
case of true breaches is, on our view, therefore just the standard 
question, which civil wrongs are sufficiently serious to warrant civil 
sanction. This is a difficult question even in tort (where the ques 
tion of punitive damages is allowed to reach a jury only in the case 
of gross torts). It may be an especially difficult question in connec 
tion with breach of contract. Where freedom of contract reigns 
broadly (and can even set the operational boundaries of good faith 
and fair dealing), it is difficult to distinguish gross breaches of con 
tract (for example, bad faith breaches) from breaches that violate 
only the contract itself.87 Moreover, mistakes in the direction of 
awarding punitive damages where none are deserved threaten both 
impermissibly to punish the innocent and to undermine the pre 
dictability of commercial litigation, thereby undoing many of the 
efficiency gains generated by expectation damages (including of 
course the gains associated with making the transfers in lieu of in 
efficient trades that our model identifies).88 These concerns require 
courts to tread carefully. In many jurisdictions, courts decided that 
they cannot tread carefully enough and so in the end declined to 
venture forth at all. But if punitive damages for gross breach of 
contract have had a short career in American law,89 this is not be 
cause of any principled tension between their moralizing nature 
and the normative structure of the expectation remedy. Rather, 
87 
This problem is not nearly so difficult in special substantive contexts, for example, 
situations involving insurance contracts, where the regulated character of the business 
entails that much less of the arrangement between the parties belongs to the contract 
and much more to the implied-in-law covenant and where the strategic structure of 
the interaction makes conduct that constitutes bad faith on any terms more easily 
identifiable. 
88 
As an example, a promisor may in good faith refuse to trade or to transfer in the 
belief that the contract, properly interpreted, authorizes her to deliver product A, but 
the promisee insists that the contract requires the delivery of product B. The law 
should not deter promisors from raising such interpretive issues. 89 
Experiments in awarding punitive damages for breach of contract, begun in the 
1970s, were ended, and indeed reversed, by the 1990s. A 1998 survey reported that by 
then thirty-nine American jurisdictions did not allow punitive damages in contract 
claims unless the plaintiff established an ordinary and independent tort and that only 
twelve jurisdictions allowed punitive damages in limited circumstances for tortious 
breach of contract. See William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Con 
tracts, 48 Duke L.J. 629,645—47 (1999). 
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courts are reluctant to award punitive damages for breach of con 
tract because of pragmatic difficulties that are internal to the effec 
tive articulation and administration of a punitive damages regime 
itself. Again, a liability rule expectation remedy—at least as a for 
mal matter—allows contract law to say all the things concerning 
breach that moralists about promising wish it to be able to say. 
2. Price Versus Renegotiation Sharing 
The moralist argument against the expectation remedy thus can 
succeed, if it succeeds at all, not on formal grounds but on substan 
tive ones. There is no good substantive argument to make, how 
ever, unless contracts contain one promise—to trade—rather than 
two promises—to trade or to transfer. The substantive arguments 
implicit in prominent moral criticisms of the expectation remedy 
fail because they overlook this point. 
An extravagant statement of the moral critique appears, for ex 
ample, in Friedmann's polemical suggestion that the theory of effi 
cient breach is, in principle, equally applicable in the property con 
text, where it leads to the adoption of a theory of "efficient theft" 
or "efficient conversion."90 The analogy works only if a promisee's 
entitlement to a promise's action terms involves the same form of 
near-total dominion that characterizes an owner's entitlement con 
cerning her chattels. But the typical promisee has waived the right 
to such dominance by accepting a contract that creates surplus 
sharing through the price mechanism. 
The idea that the promisee has dominion over the promisor's ac 
tions plays an equally central role in the arguments of more modest 
and deliberate moral critics of the expectation remedy. Like its 
doctrinal predecessor, this idea exercises a hold over intuitions that 
draws commentators back in even as they try to shake loose of it. 
A recent example is Richard Brooks's proposal for replacing "effi 
cient breach" with a remedial regime designed to ensure "efficient 
performance."91 
Brooks acknowledges "that both supporters and opponents of 
efficient breach seem to agree that promise-breaking is morally 
wrong. They just disagree about the nature of the promises made 
90 
Friedmann, supra note 5, at 4. 91 
See Brooks, supra note 5, at 573. 
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in contracts."92 Brooks nevertheless appears to accept the moral cri 
tique of the expectation remedy. Thus he supposes that "it would 
be surprising if, for most people, contractual promises do not share 
some of the moral imperatives behind promises generally,"93 and he 
assumes that these are imperatives to trade rather than to trade or 
to transfer, even going so far as to characterize the latter view 
(ours) as "morally permissive."94 Indeed, Brooks frames his discus 
sion as an effort to construct a remedy that preserves the effi 
ciency-properties of expectation damages but "is consistent with 
more robust notions of contractual duty" than those immanent in 
the expectation remedy; or as he alternatively puts it, to construct a 
remedy that "can allow for optimal allocation of resources while 
achieving a higher degree of moral force than the intermediate 
level associated with efficient breach."95 In all of this, Brooks, like 
Friedmann, is concerned with preventing promisors from profiting 
from the moral wrong involved in substituting transfer for trade: 
"What provokes disapproval of the efficient breach hypothesis," 
Brooks says, "are strong moral sentiments that nonperformance of 
a contractual promise is not a right, but in fact is a wrong, and that 
promisors should not profit from the unilateral exercise of their 
power to perform or not."96 
Brooks's efficient performance hypothesis—because it is more 
carefully elaborated than Friedmann's accusations concerning "ef 
ficient theft"—helpfully illustrates the substantive intuition at the 
heart of the moral critique of the expectation remedy. In order to 
square contract remedies with assumed morality, Brooks would 
give a promisee the right to determine how a promisor conducts 
herself in respect of a contract's action terms. Thus, he would make 
specific performance the standard remedy for breach of contract 
and allow a promisee who forgoes specific performance to force his 
promisor to disgorge any gains that the promisor's rejection of 
92 
Id. at 588. 
93 
Id. at 590. 
94 
Id. at 590-91. 
95 
Id. at 573-74. 
96 
Id. at 572-73. Courts have in recent years increasingly made similar noises. As one 
prominent decision observes, at least where "the defendant's wrongdoing is inten 
tional or substantial," the wrongdoer should not be allowed to retain the fruits of her 
wrong. Earthlnfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113,119 (Colo. 
1995). 
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trade created. Indeed, Brooks's remedy must give the promisee not 
just an entitlement to the benefits of a promisor's management of 
her actions but also an entitlement actually to control the promi 
sor's actions. This control includes forcing the promisor to 
"breach" and then to "disgorge" even when the promisor wishes to 
"perform" (in our terms, to transfer though the promisor prefers 
trade).97 Together, the two prongs of the efficient performance 
remedy secure the promisee's dominion over his promisor's actions 
regarding the contract. Brooks thus has constructed a mirror image 
of the expectation remedy, which like that more familiar remedy, 
requires a party to internalize the full social costs of his choice re 
garding how to dispose of a contracted-for action. (The expectation 
remedy makes promisors choose between the costs of action to 
themselves and the costs of non-action to their promisees; Brooks's 
remedy makes promisees choose between the costs of non-action 
to themselves and the (opportunity) costs of action to their promi 
sors.) This is the central insight of Brooks's argument concerning 
economic efficiency. 
It is unclear whether this argument can apply to actual cases. A 
promisee who requires as much control over his promisor's actions 
as Brooks supposes is likely already to have bought the promisor.98 
1,7 
Brooks is unclear as to whether he endorses this feature of his remedy-regime. He 
backs away from the suggestion at a critical juncture, recognizing that "[i]t may seem 
a little odd to think of promisees forcing promisors to breach their promises and then 
making them pay for the breach (and, indeed, there is extensive case law discouraging 
the practice of induced breach)." Brooks, supra note 5, at 582. Moreover, he suggests 
in a footnote that his remedy does not, strictly speaking, give the promisee a pure op 
tion on his promisor's performance but instead involves a "Dual Chooser Rule, 
whereby the promisor's initial action (choice) can trigger the promisee's . . . option." 
Id. at 582 n.30. But Brooks, in the very next sentences, hedges his hedge and suggests 
that the idea of promisee choice is "not so strange." Id. at 582. In any event, the effi 
ciency claims that form the core of Brooks's argument leave him structurally commit 
ted to the unfettered promisee choice that the main text analyzes. As Jody Kraus has 
pointed out, Kraus, supra note 59, at 427-28, the symmetry between Brooks's remedy 
and the expectation remedy, and therefore the chooser-cost-internalization that is 
necessary for Brooks's claims concerning efficiency to get off the ground, will be 
achieved only if promisees may force promisors to "breach" and "disgorge" in the 
manner that we describe. 
98 
Recall that the parties that contract theory analyzes often are firms. We briefly 
expand the text's point in the following way: Brooks's cost-internalization claim holds 
only if the promisee has a right to exercise control over his promisor's conduct in re 
spect of the contract's trade terms. Brooks's remedy thus makes promisees into the 
managers—with full rights to exercise command and control—of their promisors' con 
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For the moment, however, we are more concerned with explaining 
that Brooks's remedy and the expectation remedy are equally one 
sided: they equally imagine that control over contractual trade is 
vested unilaterally in a purely self-interested party; and they differ 
as to which party this should be. Brooks's remedy imports no more 
cooperation—no greater promissory solidarity—into the ex post 
contract relation than do expectation damages. Moreover, 
Brooks's unilateralism seems to us less attuned to the folk under 
standings of the promise relation than the opposite unilateralism 
associated with the expectation remedy. But in a way this is beside 
the present point, because whatever the facts concerning folk un 
derstandings turn out to be, it runs counter to the central place that 
freedom occupies in the morality of promising to insist—as Fried 
mann, Brooks, and other moralist critics of the expectation remedy 
do insist—that promissory morality requires that ex post control be 
allocated unilaterally to promisees even where (in the pursuit of 
their joint interests) promisors and promisees have agreed other 
wise. And our model shows that the parties to ordinary commercial 
contracts—because of the way they share surplus in both the trade 
and transfer states—will typically reach just this agreement. 
tractually promised actions. Speaking loosely, under the regime Brooks proposes, 
promisees in effect become owners of their promisors' businesses in respect of a con 
tract's trade terms. This way of speaking invokes the Coasean theory of the firm, ac 
cording to which the firm boundary—the boundary between coordination through 
ownership and managerial control and coordination by contract—is fixed by the bal 
ance between the transaction costs of each coordinating mechanism. See Ronald 
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in The Firm, The Market, and the Law 33, 43-44 
(1988). But if the balance of these transaction costs really did make it efficient, as 
Brooks's remedy supposes, for promisees to exercise managerial control over their 
promisors' actions, those actions would already fall within the promisees' firms, so 
there would be no need for the contracts that Brooks's remedy seeks to vindicate. Put 
simply, where the allocation of discretion and control associated with Brooks's rem 
edy really is efficient, there will be no separate legal entities to begin with and hence 
no contracts. The expectation remedy produces efficiency across the firm boundary, 
and Brooks's regime is, in effect, a re-description of efficient decision-making proce 
dures within it. This argument puts in an industrial organization context our contract 
argument that parties commonly prefer to share through prices, which assume the ex 
istence of independent firms, rather than through property right renegotiations, which 
threaten to collapse firm boundaries. 
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3. The Limits of Contractual Solidarity 
These remarks concerning contractual solidarity lead to the final 
moral criticism of the expectation remedy that we consider. Unlike 
the arguments advanced by Friedmann and Brooks, which invoke 
moral intuitions concerning how to adjudicate the competition be 
tween promisors and promisees, this criticism invokes a moral ideal 
of promissory solidarity, according to which promises (and hence 
also contracts) achieve their moral value by replacing, or at least 
dampening, this competition in favor of a more cooperative con 
tractual relation. On this account, the moral value of promises lies 
in the sharing of realized gains and losses that promises can in 
volve. One of the basic, formal features of promising is that a pro 
misor makes the promisee distinctive for her—she takes the pro 
misee out of the general sea of humanity and becomes particularly 
attentive to the promisee's person. As Joseph Raz observed, prom 
ises establish a special relationship between promisors and pro 
misees, and the value of this special relationship plausibly explains 
why it is not a sufficient reason for breaking a promise that doing 
so is best overall." Perhaps, then, the unilateralism associated with 
the expectation remedy wrongly eliminates such promissory soli 
darity, while other remedies (including, but not limited to, tradi 
tional specific performance) might make better room for it. 
This moral position is implausible if the sharing that it contem 
plates occurs as sharing occurs in our model. There, parties to the 
liability rule contract predict what later sharing requires of them, 
and they adjust the price to reflect their expected shares. Parties to 
a property rule contract share ex post but not in a way that is more 
other-regarding or solidaristic than sharing through a price reduc 
tion: sharing ex post is the product of a competitive renegotiation 
among self-interested parties bound to each other in a bilateral 
monopoly as a result of the contract they made. 
But contractual sharing ex post may arise in another context 
also—in which the parties to a contract abandon, or at least con 
strain, self-interested behavior within the contractual relation and 
instead cooperate in pursuing a fair balance of their interests. This 
99 
See Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in Law, Morality, and Society: Essays 
in Honour of H.L.A. Hart 210, 227-28 (Peter Michael Stephan Hacker & Joseph Raz 
eds., 1977). 
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kind of ex post sharing, which we call cooperative sharing, is cer 
tainly known to contract law—it is displayed by joint venturers or 
other fiduciaries, for example, as in Cardozo's famous remark that 
joint venturers owe one another "the punctilio of an honor."100 
Moreover, there is a close connection between contract and coop 
erative sharing. In particular, at least among parties who begin 
their relations at arm's length, cooperative sharing can be achieved 
only ex post, that is, within the solidaristic relation established by 
an exchange of (contractual) promises. 
Cooperative sharing has an at best uncertain appeal for the effi 
ciency-minded. To be sure, a legal regime that supports or even 
imposes cooperative sharing may serve efficiency in the narrow 
class of circumstances in which the parties cannot anticipate at the 
time of contracting what the optimal exchange will turn out to in 
volve (and perhaps also cannot verify ex post whether the other 
party has satisfied whatever standards the contract attempts to 
set).101 But in the broader class of cases in which performance can 
be described in advance and is verifiable, cooperative sharing re 
duces the promisee's expected return and increases transaction 
costs. Efficiency is not the only value, however, and at least some 
moralists about contract may be understood to propose another, 
broader, justification of cooperative sharing in contract, based on 
such sharing's intrinsic moral value. In its most general form, this 
moralism about contract claims that the morality of promise re 
quires cooperative sharing in all promise relations. All contracts 
contain promises; hence, the morality of promise requires the law 
to support, or at least not to undermine, cooperative sharing in 
contracts generally. On this view, the moral value of cooperative 
sharing outweighs the efficiency generated by the unilateralism 
that liability rule protection of the expectation makes possible. 
A moralism that insists on cooperative sharing in contract rejects 
the expectation remedy because the remedy undermines coopera 
tive sharing, as indeed such sharing is equally (if oppositely) un 
100 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 101 
See supra text accompanying notes 33-34 (outlining our epistemic assumptions). 
One of us has also proposed a related argument for the case of relationship-specific 
investments made in particular circumstances. See Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, 
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 665-67 
(2007). 
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dermined by the remedy that Brooks prefers. Both remedies quar 
antine contractual sharing within the ex ante state and allow one 
party or the other unilaterally to pursue her own interests ex post. 
Indeed, both remedies achieve their efficiencies in part by carrying 
the competitive relationship that characterizes pre-contractual bar 
gaining into the interstices of the contract relation. We therefore 
conclude our moral analysis of the expectation remedy by asking 
how this feature of the expectation remedy stands with respect to 
the morality of promising. Our procedure is first to demonstrate 
that an ideal of cooperative sharing is the source of certain moralist 
attacks on the expectation remedy and then to ask whether this 
ideal is appealing, at least in the context of commercial contracts. 
The most sustained elaboration of this moral criticism of the ex 
pectation remedy appears in the work of Seana Shiffrin, who, in a 
recent article, identified the expectation remedy and the practice of 
"efficient breach" as one of several places at which contract law 
unappealingly departs from the morality of promising102 and who 
has now elaborated the nature of this departure in greater detail.103 
Cooperative sharing does not figure expressly into Shiffrin's argu 
ment, however, and so it takes some interpretive work to show that 
this ideal is the foundation of her objection to the expectation rem 
edy. 
Shiffrin makes two claims concerning the expectation remedy, 
which together provide a point of entry to her argument's deeper 
structure. First, she claims that, under current law, when a promi 
sor transfers rather than trades, the promisee must realize trade 
himself, at best with the transferred funds. For example, a buyer 
whose seller rejects trade must make a substitute purchase.104 Sec 
ond, Shiffrin observes that conventional contract doctrine imposes 
on the promisee a legal obligation to act on his promisor's behalf, 
in the sense that the promisee must arrange a substitute at least 
cost to the promisor. In the language of the doctrine, the promisee 
must mitigate the promisor's damages.105 Shiffrin is hostile to both 
102 
See Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, supra note 5, at 729. 103 
Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral, supra note 5, at 1552. 104 
See id. at 1564-65. 
105 
Id. This requirement also may be expressed in causation terms. The promisor's 
failure to trade creates an expectation loss for the promisee. Any damage increment 
above this loss that a cost-justified promisee action could have prevented is attribut 
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aspects of the doctrine. In her view, the disappointed promisee has 
been betrayed. Forcing him to reenter the market, and in a manner 
that weighs the promisor's interests as equal to his own, adds insult 
to injury. 
Shiffrin's claim that the doctrine insults a disappointed promisee 
is important. To be sure, Shiffrin also objects to the doctrine be 
cause the duty it creates may be costly for the promisee to satisfy. 
For example, she worries about the serious inconvenience a home 
owner incurs when a plumber refuses to repair.106 Her distaste for 
mitigation cannot rest on the existence of such costs, however. 
Mitigation requirements are structured so that a buyer who miti 
gates is supposed to be at least as well off as performance would 
have left him: any costs that mitigation causes are compensable as 
incidental damages. In the real world, of course, some mitigation 
costs—emotional upset, hours spent finding another contract part 
ner—may go uncompensated. But that is a defect in the law rather 
than its purpose, and Shiffrin's objection is to the law's ideals. 
Hence, she claims, the objection would hold even in a fantasy 
world in which to mitigate would cost promisees nothing.107 
Insult thus is the gravamen of her critique. It is the case, in the 
fantasy world as well as ours, that a promisor who rejects trade has 
unilaterally allocated to the promisee the task of securing a substi 
tute performance. Shiffrin adds, though admitting that this way of 
speaking exaggerates the point, that the promisor has made the 
promisee her "involuntary employee." As Shiffrin says, "[sjhe has 
usurped [his] ability to make independent, voluntary decisions 
about the use and form of [his] time, attention, and labor." And 
able to the promisee. As an example of the law's causation language, a buyer may re 
cover "any loss . . . which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." 
U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (2011). A promisee's limited right to recover can be justified on 
either causation or mitigation grounds because both grounds rest on the same prem 
ise, that the promisor is obligated to pay the expectation but is not obligated to trade. 
The promisee thus causes any loss above the expectation and must achieve trade on 
his own. 
106 
Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral, supra note 5, at 1564-65. 107 
Id. We do not deny that this is a fantasy or that the expectation remedy and miti 
gation requirement, as administered, sometimes are undercompensatory. We devote 
these pages to defending what the critics (Shiffrin included) attack, namely the ideal 
ized, fully compensatory expectation remedy. 
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this usurpation, when done to a free and rational person, is an in 
sult.108 
It is incorrect to claim that promisees are insulted, however. 
Shiffrin's argument presupposes what we deny: that the typical 
contract requires the promisor only to trade, so that her failure to 
trade is a breach whose consequences the promisee must mitigate. 
Rather, we show that the promisee's payoff, in the critics' ideal 
world, is invariant to whether the contract requires trade or 
whether the contract permits the promisor to choose whether to 
trade or to transfer. In more realistic scenarios, the promisee's re 
turn is higher under the latter, liability rule contract.109 
An additional reason for this preference, not set out above, ex 
ists when the promisee can procure a substitute more cheaply than 
the promisor. In these common cases, the price is lower when the 
promisor is permitted to reject trade because the price reflects the 
promisor's costs. A legal regime in which a promisee must mitigate 
therefore does not impose any involuntary obligation on the pro 
misee; rather, it makes him the beneficiary of an efficient contract 
whose terms he chose. (He is the beneficiary because, recall, the 
gains associated with mitigation are shared through the contract 
price.) A buyer who purchases under the standard contract has 
therefore not been rendered the promisor's employee but rather, 
as it were, mitigates on his own account. The mitigation require 
ment thus not only advances the promisee's interests; it is an ex 
pression of his freedom. 
108 
Id. at 1564; see also Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, supra note 
5, at 724-26. Shiffrin uses the example of a homeowner and a plumber to make these 
points. This example is significant. A natural person who is a promisor may insult a 
natural person who is a promisee, but it may be a category mistake to claim that Cor 
poration A "insults" Corporation Β by refusing to trade. Shiffrin criticizes the mitiga 
tion requirement as it applies everywhere, but it takes, we think, a theory of "corpo 
rate insult" to show that the criticism applies in commercial contexts. No such theory 
exists, at least at present (although one of us thinks it might be developed). The text 
above, however, meets her argument on the general terms in which it is expressed. 109 
Shiffrin also criticizes the mitigation requirement because promisees, in her view, 
desire for themselves the goods and services that constitute trade rather than (as the 
mitigation requirement supposes) view trade as a way station on the road to further 
economic advantage. See Shiffrin. Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral, supra note 
5, at 1565. This claim, too, seems out of place in the typical commercial exchange. A 
business buyer does not want goods or services simpliciter; he wants the gain that 
trade in goods or services yield. It follows that he prefers the contract that maximizes 
his expected gain to the lower value contract that requires trade always. 
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But Shiffrin (unlike Friedmann and Brooks) identifies another 
ground for insisting that promisors are obligated specifically to 
trade, a ground that sounds in the character of the contract rela 
tion. This comes out later in her argument, when she remarks on 
an apparent asymmetry between the parties' positions before and 
after they contract. A promisee cannot force his promisor to enter 
into a contract by offering to pay the price of the contract's action 
terms (a buyer may not force someone to sell by offering to pay the 
good's market price). Once a contract is made, however, the pro 
misor can force her promisee to replace her trade with someone 
else's (at least where cover is efficient, a seller may force her buyer 
to cover).110 It is at least "peculiar,"111 Shiffrin says, that a promisor 
enjoys greater protection against involuntary interference from her 
promisee without the contract relation than her promisee enjoys 
against involuntary interference from her within it. "[Tjhere is no 
clear reason why after the relationship is formed, [the] nonconsen 
sual behavior [involved in a promisor's unilateral decision to trans 
fer rather than to trade] should be more morally anodyne than it 
would have been ex ante."112 Indeed, Shiffrin suggests, such behav 
ior is simply wrong. 
There is a "clear reason," however, which is that the promisor's 
actions are consensual. Under what we have called the liability rule 
contract, the promisee agrees, in return for a price reduction, to 
permit the promisor later to choose between trade and transfer. 
The promisor's "unilateral decision" thus is no more unilateral 
than is the decision of any agent whose principle instructs her to 
choose between two permitted acts. We shall give this explanation 
of the parties' preferences a moral interpretation in a moment.113 
110 
This is not quite literally so: a seller cannot require her buyer to cover but only to 
choose between covering and not getting the good at all. 111 
Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral, supra note 5, at 1566. 1,2 
Id. 
113 
Shiffrin raises a final economic argument against understanding contracts, as we 
do, to involve promises to trade or to transfer. She observes that promisees typically 
enter into contracts because they are interested in receiving the specific goods or ser 
vices that the contracts' promises specify rather than the generic value of these goods 
or services, as reflected in the contracts' transfer terms. Id. at 1565. She then invites 
one to "[cjonsider the absurd result in such cases if the payment of expectation dam 
ages were the universalized, reflexive response to agreements. No promisee would 
ever get what she sought. As a further consequence, if this were the universalized re 
sponse, then agreements would never be made." Id. This argument apparently as 
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But first we observe that Shiffrin's concern is justifiable on a dif 
ferent view of the contract relation. According to this view, enter 
ing into a contract changes the relationship between contracting 
parties, so that even where they have approached each other at 
arm's length, the contract makes their relation within it closer than 
arm's length. The parties' duties under a contract thus cannot be 
measured by the contract alone.114 Instead, parties have an open 
ended duty to cooperate. This duty requires each party to respect 
the interests and motives that led the other to enter into the con 
tract and to adjust to new facts and circumstances in a way that is 
other-regarding in respect of these motives and interests. Shiffrin 
reasons from the existence of this duty to the conclusion that while 
a promisor may refuse to make a contract, though the potential 
promisee offers a fair price, the promisor cannot both contract and 
keep the promisee at arm's length regarding performance. To be 
precise, when contract law authorizes the promisor to choose ex 
post between transfer and trade, depending on which maximizes 
her utility, the law thus undermines the cooperative sharing that 
constitutes the moral essence of the promissory relation and hence 
also of contract. Shiffrin's view that a promisor who transfers 
rather than trades drafts her promisee into her service, in the same 
way that a promisee would do if he could force the promisor to 
contract by offering the market price, thus is explicable only on the 
assumption that contracts typically replace arm's length sharing ex 
ante with cooperative sharing ex post. 
sumes that a seller who has the right either to trade or to transfer will always choose 
to transfer. Section II.A above shows, in contrast, that the seller chooses to transfer 
only when trade would produce a larger loss. Since giving the seller the ability to 
minimize ex post losses maximizes the buyer's expected return, there is more trade 
under the expectation interest remedy than there would be under Shiffrin's proposed 
remedial scheme. 
114 
Here it is worth noting a contrast between such an open-ended duty to cooperate 
and the mandatory duty of good faith in performance that contract law imposes. The 
content of the duty of good faith is limited by the content of the parties' promises: 
good faith forbids each party from exploiting vulnerabilities that arise over the course 
of a contract relationship in ways that prevent the other from realizing the benefits 
that the contract confers. Good faith is thus a duty that exists only at arm's length—a 
duty not to exploit subsequent events in ways that undermine the division of surplus 
that the initial arm's length agreement fixed. Unlike cooperative sharing, good faith 
does not involve any open-ended obligation to attend to the motives and interests of 
the other party in ways that extend beyond the division of surplus agreed to in arm's 
length sharing ex ante. See generally U.C.C. § 1-304 (2011). 
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This analysis explains Shiffrin's view but does not justify it. 
Commercial parties, we show, prefer to let the promisor choose be 
tween trade and transfer. Hence, Shriffrin's view commits her to 
the claim that contract law should override the parties' preferences 
in order to force them to be good. To understand why Shiffrin is 
committed to paternalism, consider the cases in which the law ap 
plies a cooperative model of ex post sharing within promissory or 
contractual relations: marriage and, more generally, joint ven 
tures.115 Sharing in these relationships cannot be cabined by the 
terms of the agreements that establish them: a fact that is self 
consciously announced by the language of the marriage vow—"for 
better or for worse"—and by the duty of fiduciary fidelity that joint 
venturers owe to each other. Sharing is not cabined contractually 
because these relationships involve the adoption of a shared pro 
ject: a family, in the case of marriage; and a business enterprise, in 
the case of a joint venture. The parties to such contracts agree to 
pursue the projects (at least in some measure) apart from the con 
tributions that the projects make to their individual interests: as 
measured by these interests, the parties, sometimes literally, agree 
to pursue their projects for better or for worse. And in these cases 
something like Shiffrin's analysis of breach applies. A promisor 
who transferred rather than traded would betray the joint venture's 
shared project in favor of the antecedent purely personal interests 
that the project was intended to replace, and vindicating her pro 
misee's expectation interest would similarly measure the value that 
115 
Thus courts commonly observe that "[j]oint venturers, like partners in a partner 
ship, owe a fiduciary duty to one another." Miami Subs. Corp. v. Murray Family 
Trust, 703 A.2d 1366,1373-74 (N.H. 1997); see also, e.g., Elee. Assocs., Inc. v. Auto 
matic Equip. Dev. Corp., 440 A.2d 249,251 (Conn. 1981) ("As a matter of law, parties 
to joint ventures undertake fiduciary duties to each other concerning matters within 
the scope of the joint venture." (citing Sime v. Malouf, 212 P.2d 946, 954-55 (Cal. 
1950)); Lucas v. Abbott, 601 P.2d 1376, 1379 (Colo. 1979))). The marriage relation 
establishes analogous duties among the partners. Thus: 
Courts simply should not countenance either party to such a unique human re 
lationship [i.e., marriage], dealing with each other at arm's length . . . We have 
recognized, furthermore, in the context of an action based upon fraud, that the 
special relationship between fiduciary and beneficiary compels full disclosure 
by the fiduciary. Although marital parties are not necessarily in the relationship 
of fiduciary to beneficiary, we believe that no less disclosure is required of such 
parties when they come to a court seeking to terminate their marriage. 
Billington v. Billington, 595 A.2d 1377,1381 (Conn. 1991). 
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he placed on performance in a metric that the initial contract 
agreed to abandon. But note that the betrayal is of the relation that 
the parties ex ante agreed to establish. The law requires coopera 
tive behavior ex post to implement the parties' ex ante preference 
for a sharing regime. And most parties, in most circumstances, do 
not prefer this regime. 
Thus, even purely personal promises seem intuitively often to 
involve only ex ante sharing cabined by the terms of an agreement 
rather than cooperative sharing ex post. Suppose, for example, that 
a sports-lover promises to treat her opera-loving friend to a per 
formance of Pelléas et Mélisande and that when she goes to buy the 
tickets she learns that only unexpectedly expensive seats remain 
available and therefore decides not to give the treat. What ought 
she now to do? To be sure, she cannot vindicate her promise by 
giving her friend a cash payment equal to the value that he ascribes 
to seeing the opera. But the reason why the ordinary morality of 
promising balks at such cash payments is not necessarily that it re 
jects the idea of equivalent performance, tout court, but only that 
introducing money payments into personal relations has commodi 
fying and alienating effects and hence is generally taboo.116 More 
over, suppose that the promisor discovers that Rodrigue et 
Chimène is playing across town, that ordinarily-priced seats remain 
available there, and that her friend loves both operas equally. If 
she unilaterally substitutes the second opera for the first, has she 
committed a wrong, or indeed even broken her promise? 
We think that, save in unusual circumstances, she has not. An 
arrangement of this sort is best understood as a promise to give her 
friend a treat of a certain (rough) cost and value. As it turned out, 
delivery of the treat that the promise expressly named—the analog 
of trade—was unexpectedly, and inefficiently, expensive, and so 
the promisor substituted an alternative performance—the analog 
of transfer—that made her friend whole and cost her less. That 
116 
The same effect may readily be seen in a tort-like context, for example, when a 
dinner guest breaks one of his host's wine glasses. Although the guest clearly has a 
duty of redress, paying the host the cash value of the glass will not satisfy it (and may 
even make matters worse). Moreover, although the guest might satisfy his duty by giv 
ing the host a replacement glass, he might also (and indeed better) make redress by 
providing some alternative (and roughly equivalent) gift, for example, a bunch of 
flowers or a box of chocolates. 
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there is no breach may be seen intuitively by observing that, al 
though the promisor might in this case owe her friend an explana 
tion for the change, she would not, once the explanation had been 
given, owe any further apology. Indeed, if the friend sought to ex 
tract an apology then he, and not she, would conventionally be 
thought to be violating the norms implicit in their relationship. 
Things might be different if the friends were both opera-buffs 
whose promises established the shared project of finally seeing 
Pelléas et Mélisande, as the personal equivalent of a joint venture. 
In this case, the friends have made a commitment to seeing that 
particular opera as a non-instrumentally valued, shared goal, and 
so the first friend might be unable to acquit herself of her part in 
the plan by substituting another opera of equivalent instrumental 
value. But most personal promises, we think, are more like the 
original case than the modification. They are viewed by parties to 
them as instruments useful in pursuing antecedent and independ 
ent purposes, and they may therefore be honored by means alter 
native to those that they expressly name. 
In any event, this instrumental account better captures the char 
acter of commercial promises—and hence of contracts—than the 
non-instrumental alternative associated with the joint venture 
model. The parties to contracts typically view each other and the 
trades that their contracts' action-terms describe as instrumental 
(and hence in principle interchangeable) means in the pursuit of 
commercial ends that pre-date, and are not altered by, the com 
mitments that the contracts establish. This is as it should be.117 Con 
tract law's moral (and not just economic) purpose is to enable co 
ordination on neutral terms in an open and pluralist economic and 
political order. In this order, contracts may arise between parties 
on either side of every economic and political dispute. And con 
117 
One of us has previously argued that contracts establish a certain form of joint 
activity among the parties to them, that this activity is characterized by sharing the 
end of achieving the contractual performance, and that this sharing underwrites the 
contract relations' moral worth. See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 
113 Yale L.J. 1417, 1456-58 (2004). But the kind of sharing described there remains 
quite different from the ex post cooperation associated with a view like Shiffrin's. It is 
confined within the contract and has its content fixed by the terms of the contract, and 
it is therefore much thinner than cooperative sharing (a point emphasized by calling 
such sharing collaboration and expressly rejecting the idea that it involves coopera 
tion, see id. at 1457). 
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tract law can be open in this way only if parties can contract with 
out ceding control over their larger purposes—that is, without 
committing themselves to cooperative sharing ex post in service of 
non-instrumental values. Turning to contract law's connection to 
liberty rather than to neutrality, a legal order that insists on coop 
erative sharing ex post is inconsistent with freedom of contract. 
This order would convert the contract relation into a kind of or 
ganic community, almost a status order, that parties may avoid al 
together but cannot freely contour and constrain. 
The tension between the modes of sharing associated with ordi 
nary contract and cooperative sharing is greater still. To see why, 
observe that the mode of sharing involved in promise and, a forti 
ori, contract is incompatible with there being a total identification 
between the parties—this is just a way of characterizing the famil 
iar thought that to make a promise to oneself is impossible. More 
over (although this will likely be a more controversial claim), 
promissory and contractual sharing are also difficult to establish 
among parties who, although not totally self-identical, nevertheless 
possess very close antecedent connections. In the personal realm, 
for example, it is difficult to make effective promises within fully 
companionate marriages, because both partners' commitments to 
maximizing their joint outcome (viewed as a non-instrumental 
value) mean that any promissory rights that might arise between 
them will dissolve when this is no longer, from the point of view of 
the couple, best overall.118 And even in the commercial realm, there 
exist limits on freedom of contract within fiduciary relationships,119 
because the self-interest that lies at the core of contractual sharing 
is incompatible with the cooperative attitudes required by the fidu 
ciary form. Cooperative sharing, on Shiffrin's model, therefore 
118 
See Daniel Markovits, Promise as an Arm's Length Relation, in Promises and 
Agreements: Philosophical Essays 295,309-13 (Hanoch Sheinman ed., 2011). 19 
For example, a lawyer may not represent a client if the representation involves 
"the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the law 
yer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal," Model Rules of 
Prof'l Conduct R. 1.7(b)(3) (2007), or more generally, if she cannot "provide compe 
tent and diligent representation to each affected client." Id. at R. 1.7(b)(1); see also 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 122(2)(a) (2000). In each case, 
it does not matter if the client knowingly agrees to the representation, nevertheless. 
Freedom of contract does not penetrate the fiduciary lawyer-client relation, and the 
conflicts are, in the language of the law of lawyering, non-consentable. 
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does not just present an alternative to the thinner forms of solidar 
ity associated with contractual sharing as we understand it; rather, 
where it arises or is imposed, cooperative sharing makes contrac 
tual solidarity impossible. Shiffrin's model is therefore, strictly 
speaking, incompatible with the forms of sharing associated with 
contract. 
The ex ante sharing associated with the expectation remedy and 
the view that contracts involve promises to trade or to transfer 
therefore better match not just the economic but also the moral 
purposes of contract than does Shiffrin's alternative. For these rea 
sons, we reject cooperative sharing ex post as the right model of 
the contract relation. Instead, the substantive values associated 
with promissory morality, when applied to the special case of con 
tractual promises, favor arm's length, ex ante sharing. Moreover, 
our economic model reveals that parties who engage in arm's 
length sharing produce agreements that do not fetishize trade over 
transfer but rather permit promisors to honor their promises by 
performing the promises' transfer terms. The morality of promising 
thus aligns with the economics of contract. These reflections sug 
gest that in addition to being formally consistent with taking a 
moralistic view of contract law, protecting the expectation with a 
liability rule (properly understood as an interpretive presumption) 
is also consistent with promissory morality's substantive ideals, at 
least when these are applied to the ordinary circumstances of 
commercial contracting. 
Conclusion 
The expectation interest remedy is traditionally justified because 
it produces efficient breach: the promisor breaches only when her 
gain from breach would exceed the gain that the promisee would 
have made from trade because the remedy requires the promisor 
to pay the promisee's trading gain. This justification of the remedy 
is weak. It holds that the remedy yields ex post efficiency, but ex 
post efficiency is realizable under any remedy because parties can 
renegotiate to the ex post efficient state regardless of the initial le 
gal starting point. When every remedy yields the same ex post out 
come, parties who decide on monetary grounds, such as firms, 
seemingly have no reason to prefer any particular remedy at the 
contracting stage. 
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Critics of the expectation interest remedy propose replacing it 
with property right remedies, such as specific performance. On the 
critics' view, a contractual promise creates in the promisee a right 
to the promisor's performance. Rights are best protected with 
property rules. In addition, a property rule regime produces a 
fairer distribution of the savings from avoiding inefficient perform 
ances than the expectation regime. The critics' view, however, is 
subject to the same irrelevance critique. All remedies put the pro 
misee in the same (monetary) place; hence, every remedy necessar 
ily protects the promisee's rights and is equally attractive distribu 
tionally. 
We break this theoretical tie by relaxing two assumptions that 
are made in the expectation debate: contracting and renegotiation 
are costless and promisors always can pay. When these assump 
tions are discarded but the assumption that courts are sufficiently 
informed to protect the expectation is retained, promisees, we ar 
gue, prefer contracts that confer on the promisor discretion either 
to satisfy the contract's action terms—to supply the specified goods 
or services—or to pay the gain that performance of those terms 
would have yielded. What we call "the dual performance hypothe 
sis" supposes typical promisees to have this preference; hence, our 
argument validates the hypothesis if it persuades. 
We defend the hypothesis on five related grounds: (i) Under the 
conditions the critics assume, a promisee's expected gross payoff 
under a contract does not vary with the remedy he has. A property 
rule contract gives the promisee the power to capture a share of 
the gain that rejecting trade creates through a renegotiation; mar 
kets give the promisee to a liability rule contract the power to cap 
ture the same share of the gain through the vehicle of a lower 
price, (ii) A promisee's expected net payoff often is higher under 
the liability rule contract because it is less costly to write than a 
property rule contract and, unlike the property rule contract, can 
yield ex post efficiency without renegotiation, (iii) Were both con 
tract types enforceable, the liability rule contract would be a good 
default when courts are sufficiently informed to protect the expec 
tation; parties would accept the default because contracts that pro 
tect the expectation with a liability rule commonly are maximizing 
relative to contracts that create property rights, (iv) A promisee's 
consent to a liability rule default is actual rather than hypothetical. 
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The price of a contract is a joint function of the cost of the action 
terms and the size of the transfer term. Sophisticated parties pay 
attention to what deals buy them and thus pay attention to both 
components of the price, (v) "Efficient" breach is a myth because 
no true breach—a promisor's failure either to trade or to pay—can 
be efficient. 
These grounds support our claim that the expectation remedy is 
analytically consistent with the immanent normative structure of 
contract. The expectation remedy is also formally consistent with 
taking a moralistic approach to contract law, according to which 
true breaches of contract are wrongs that can qualify for punitive 
damages. Additionally, we argue that the ex ante sharing associ 
ated with the expectation remedy best captures the substantive 
ideals behind promissory morality, at least as these ideals are 
worked out for the case of promises among strangers in open, plu 
ralist economic and political orders. Together, these arguments re 
new the overall case for making expectation damages the standard 
remedy for breach of contract.120 
Our broader argument is best understood as pursuing a repre 
sentation result—that is, it is an effort to lay bare the formal struc 
ture of the contract relation.121 We have shown that a certain set of 
economic, philosophical, and legal ideas can represent a particular 
legal practice. More specifically, we demonstrate that the substitu 
tionary account of the expectation remedy (which is implicit in 
both the efficient breach hypothesis and the writings of those who 
criticize efficient breach) is merely epiphenomenal and, moreover, 
misleading. We explain the expectation remedy more accurately 
without including any substitutionary remedy in the explanation, 
instead treating every contract remedy as formally an instance of 
specific performance and allowing the content of the obligation 
that is being specifically enforced to vary, according to the dual 
performance hypothesis. 
120 
We remind readers that this result holds only when the buyer's value is verifiable 
or the buyer can be made whole by cover and market damages. When these condi 
tions are absent, parties have an incentive to contract for liquidated damages or prop 
erty rule protection. Courts should enforce both contract types. See, e.g., Schwartz, 
supra note 58. 121 
We thank John Mikhail and Henry Smith for pressing us helpfully on this point. 
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This representation result matters for legal practice—for the de 
velopment of doctrine and the outcomes in concrete cases. The 
criticisms of the expectation remedy that we seek to debunk may 
be understood, at a general and abstract level, as asserting that the 
substitutionary account of the expectation remedy implicit in the 
theory of efficient breach is inconsistent with the formal structures 
of contract and promise that law and morality establish. Insofar as 
courts and other lawmakers accept these criticisms, they will be 
tempted (as in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and in 
Earthlnfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Resource Consultants, lnc}22) to 
award disappointed promisees supracompensatory remedies on the 
model of disgorgement. Our argument, however, demonstrates 
that to do this is wrong: the actual formal structure of contract and 
promise—which makes specific performance (formally under 
stood) the only remedy for breach—is sufficiently capacious to 
support the efficient outcomes that the theory of efficient breach 
recommends.123 We therefore affirm the still-conventional account 
of the positive law against its revisionist critics. 
122 900 P.2d 113,120 (Colo. 1995). 123 
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts § 344 (1981). 
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